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This paper presents new tests of the permanent income hypothesis and other widely used models of
household behavior using data from the labor market.  We estimate the "excess sensitivity" of job
search behavior to cash-on-hand using sharp discontinuities in eligibility for severance pay and extended
unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in Austria.  Analyzing data for over one-half million job losers,
we obtain three empirical results: (1) a lump-sum severance payment equal to two months of earnings
reduces the job-finding rate by 8-12% on average; (2) an extension of the potential duration of UI
benefits from 20 weeks to 30 weeks similarly lowers job-finding rates in the first 20 weeks of search
by 5-9%; and (3) increases in the duration of search induced by the two programs have little or no
effect on subsequent job match quality.  Using a search theoretic model, we show that estimates of
the relative effect of severance pay and extended benefits can be used to calibrate and test a wide set
of intertemporal models.  Our estimates of this ratio are inconsistent with the predictions of a standard
permanent income model, as well as naive "rule of thumb" behavior.  The representative job searcher
in our data is 70% of the way between the permanent income benchmark and credit-constrained behavior
in terms of sensitivity to cash-on-hand.
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Does disposable income (￿cash-on-hand￿ ) a⁄ect household behavior? The answer to this basic ques-
tion has implications for many areas of economics. In macroeconomics, the answer distinguishes
between a set of widely used models, ranging from the permanent income hypothesis (where changes
in disposable income have small e⁄ects on current consumption) to ￿rule of thumb￿models (where
consumption rises dollar-for-dollar with income). In public ￿nance, the answer matters for optimal
tax and social insurance policies. Temporary tax cuts can only be e⁄ective as a ￿scal stimulus
if households are sensitive to cash-on-hand. Similarly, the bene￿ts of temporary income support
programs such as unemployment insurance and welfare depend on the extent to which individuals
can smooth short-term income ￿ uctuations on their own (Baily 1978, Chetty 2006a).
The e⁄ects of cash-on-hand have been studied since the 1950s in the macroeconomics literature,
where researchers have estimated the e⁄ects of windfall cash grants on consumption (see section II
for a brief summary of this literature). However, there is still no ￿rm consensus on the extent to
which individuals can smooth consumption, due in part to limitations of the available data. As a
result, the issue of which model best describes household behavior remains controversial.1
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the validity of alternative dynamic models by es-
timating the e⁄ects of cash-on-hand on labor market behavior. In particular, we study whether
lump-sum severance payments for job losers in Austria a⁄ect unemployment durations and sub-
sequent job outcomes. Conceptually, our analysis is similar to existing studies of sensitivity to
cash-on-hand. We simply use a di⁄erent measure of ￿consumption￿ ￿search intensity instead
of purchased goods. Excess sensitivity of search intensity to cash-on-hand distinguishes between
the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) and other dynamic models in the same way as excess
sensitivity of consumption. Indeed, using a simple job search model, we show that the e⁄ects of
cash-on-hand on consumption can be inferred from its e⁄ects on search behavior.
Our labor market approach complements existing consumption-based studies in three ways.
First, the institutional features of the labor market we study allow a sharper research design.
Eligibility for severance pay in Austria is based on a simple discontinuous rule that applies to
nearly all workers: people with 3 or more years of job tenure are eligible, whereas those with
shorter tenures are not. In addition, administrative wage and employment data are available
for the universe of private sector workers, providing a sample of 650,000 job losers. The sharp
1The lack of consensus is underscored in the review by Browning and Lusardi (1996), who note that they personally
disagree on importance of liquidity constraints.
1discontinuity and large sample size allow us to obtain more precise estimates of the e⁄ects of
cash-on-hand than consumption-based studies, which are often constrained by small samples and
di¢ culties in measurement of nondurable consumption. Second, the severance payment is generous
￿equivalent to two months of pre-tax salary, or 2,300 Euros at the sample mean. This overcomes
Browning and Crossley￿ s (2001) criticism that the welfare cost of failing to smooth small amounts
(e.g. the $300-$600 tax rebates in Johnson, Parker, and Souleles 2006) is negligible. Third, the panel
structure of our data set allows us to measure the long-term e⁄ects of cash grants on subsequent
job quality. The size of match quality e⁄ects is an important issue of independent interest in
the job search literature, and estimating their magnitude enables us to further distinguish between
alternative models of search behavior.
We exploit the quasi-experiment created by the discontinuous Austrian severance pay law using
a regression discontinuity (RD) design, essentially comparing the search behavior of individuals
who were laid o⁄ just before and just after the 36 month cuto⁄ for eligibility. The key threat
to a causal interpretation of our estimates is that ￿rms may alter their ￿ring decisions to avoid
paying severance, leading to non-random selection around the discontinuity and invaliding the
￿experiment.￿We evaluate this possibility by comparing the number of layo⁄s at each level of job
tenure, and by examining the characteristics of job losers with just under and just over 3 years of
tenure. We ￿nd no systematic evidence of selection on observables around the discontinuity ￿a
result that is consistent with relatively restrictive ￿ring regulations in Austria and laws against the
strategic timing of layo⁄s.2 We further evaluate the key identi￿cation assumption by analyzing
subsamples in which selective ￿ring is less plausible (people laid o⁄ from small ￿rms, or as part of
a larger group) and by conducting a ￿placebo test￿of the e⁄ect of tenure in earlier jobs. None
of these speci￿cation tests points to any evidence of selective ￿ring, suggesting that discontinuities
in search outcomes around the 36 month cuto⁄ can be attributed to the causal e⁄ect of severance
pay.
Our empirical analysis leads to three main ￿ndings. First, lump sum severance pay has a clearly
discernible and economically signi￿cant e⁄ect on the duration of joblessness. The hazard rate of
￿nding a new job during the ￿rst 20 weeks of the unemployment spell (the period of eligibility for
regular unemployment bene￿ts in Austria) is 8-12% percent lower for those who are just barely
eligible for severance pay than for those who are just barely ineligible. This sensitivity to cash-
2Firms with 5 or more workers must also obtain the approval of their Works Council to lay o⁄ workers, reducing
the ￿ exibility to strategically ￿re workers just before the 36 month cuto⁄.
2on-hand is inconsistent with a full insurance model where agents are perfectly insured against all
income shocks. Second, using a parallel analysis of a discontinuity in the unemployment insurance
(UI) bene￿t system, we ￿nd that job seekers who are eligible for 30 weeks of bene￿ts exhibit 5-9%
lower rates of job ￿nding during the ￿rst 20 weeks of search than job seekers eligible for 20 weeks
of UI bene￿ts. This result shows that individuals anticipate the longer duration of bene￿ts and
reduce their search e⁄ort before the bene￿t extension takes e⁄ect. Such forward-looking behavior
is inconsistent with a naive ￿rule of thumb￿model where agents are completely myopic.
Third, we ￿nd that neither lump sum severance payments nor extended bene￿ts have any
e⁄ect on the ￿quality￿ of subsequent jobs. Mean wages, the duration of subsequent jobs, and
other measures of job quality are una⁄ected by eligibility for severance pay or extended bene￿ts.
An advantage of our approach relative to earlier studies is that we have enough precision to rule
out fairly small job quality gains. For example, the additional search induced by the severance
payment or bene￿t extension is estimated to raise the mean subsequent wage by less than 1% at the
upper bound of the 95% con￿dence interval. Thus, severance pay and extended bene￿ts appear
to increase the duration of jobless spells primarily via a reduction in search intensity, rather than
through an increase in the reservation wages of job seekers.
We interpret our reduced-form ￿ndings through the framework of a job search model that
nests several commonly used models of household behavior. In particular, we construct a sample
moment based on the relative e⁄ects of severance pay and bene￿t extensions that can be used to
calibrate and test between these models. We then simulate the values of this moment from a
simple version of the PIH model with unrestricted borrowing and a fully credit-constrained model.
Comparing the predicted moments with our empirical estimates, we ￿nd that the PIH model is
rejected by the data with p < 0:01, even with high discount rates or risk aversion. Our estimates
suggest that deviations from the PIH benchmark are substantial: typical job searchers behave as
if they are located 70% of the way between the PIH with unrestricted borrowing and the fully
credit-constrained case (see Figure 1). We conclude that models with forward-looking behavior
but limited consumption smoothing ￿such as Deaton￿ s (1991) bu⁄er-stock model ￿are most likely
to ￿t the data. This characterization implies that temporary income support and tax policies can
have substantial e⁄ects on economic welfare.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses related literature. Section III presents a the-
oretical search model and derives the moment for calibration. Section IV describes the institutional
background and data. Section V outlines our estimation strategy and identi￿cation assumptions.
3Section VI presents the empirical results on unemployment durations, and Section VII presents
results on search outcomes. Section VIII uses the empirical estimates to test between models.
Section IX concludes.
II Related Literature
Our analysis builds on insights and methods from several literatures in macroeconomics, public
￿nance, and labor economics. First, several studies have estimated the e⁄ects of transitory income
shocks on consumption.3 Bodkin (1959) and Bird and Bodkin (1965) estimated that World War
II veterans spent 40-70% of a one-time unexpected payment issued in 1950 on current nondurable
consumption. Subsequent studies of tax rebates using aggregate data (e.g., Blinder, 1981; Blinder
and Deaton, 1985; Poterba 1988) also found relatively large impacts on nondurable consumption
in the quarter of receipt.
More recent microdata-based studies of pre-announced tax cuts and rebates have obtained
somewhat mixed results. Shapiro and Slemrod (1995), Parker (1999), and Souleles (1999) present
evidence that current nondurable spending absorbs 30-65 percent of the change in after-tax current
income using variation in tax refunds and social security tax withholding. In contrast, Paxson
(1992) ￿nds that farmers in Thailand successfully smooth income ￿ uctuations due to rainfall shocks.
Browning and Collado (2001) ￿nd that the extra wages paid to Spanish workers in June and
December have no e⁄ect on consumption patterns. Similarly, Hsieh (2003) ￿nds no relation
between spending and the timing of payments from the Alaska State fund. Most recently, Johnson,
Parker, and Souleles (2006) analyze the 2001 federal tax rebates, and ￿nd increases in non-durable
consumption in the quarter the check was mailed of 20-30 cents per dollar. As in other consumption-
based studies, however, the con￿dence intervals for these estimates are relatively wide, covering a
range from 5 to 65 cents per dollar.
Browning and Crossley (2001) argue that many of the studies that ￿nd a high marginal propen-
sity to consume out of current income are identi￿ed from small income ￿ uctuations. Since the
welfare losses from failing to smooth over small amounts are modest, they argue that the ￿ndings
can be viewed as evidence of bounded rationality, rather than as a failure of the standard lifecycle
3Many other strands of the consumption literature are also related, including the tests for excess sensitivity in
Flavin (1981), Hall and Mishkin (1982), and Altonji and Siow (1987), tests for the e⁄ect of current information
on future changes in in consumption (Hall 1978), tests for liquidity constraints and precautionary-savings behavior
(e.g. Zeldes 1989, Gourinchas and Parker 2001, Fuchs-Schundeln and Schundeln 2005), and tests for rule of thumb
behavior (Campbell and Mankiw 1989). See Deaton (1992) for a summary and thoughtful interpretation of much of
the literature up the early 1990s, and Browning and Crossley (2001) for a more recent survey.
4model. Our study involves a substantial cash grant (two months of wages) and yields relatively
precise estimates of the e⁄ects of this grant, so we believe it is less subject to this criticism.
A second and related literature uses variation in UI bene￿ts to estimate the e⁄ect of current
income on the consumption of job losers. Gruber (1997) relates the change in food consumption for
families with a recently unemployed head to the generosity of the UI bene￿ts potentially available
to the head. He estimates that a 10% increase in the UI bene￿t level leads to approximately a 3
percent increase in food consumption by the unemployed. Subsequent studies by Browning and
Crossley (1999) and Bloemen and Stancanelli (2005) on samples of longer-term job losers in Canada
and the U.K. ￿nd smaller e⁄ects of UI bene￿ts on total expenditures for all job losers, but larger
e⁄ects among job losers with low assets prior to job loss. Interestingly, Bloemen and Stancanelli
report that job losers who received severance bene￿ts have higher consumption while unemployed,
a result consistent with our ￿ndings below.
Outside the consumption literature, our analysis is also related to studies of the e⁄ects of un-
employment bene￿ts and assets on the duration of unemployment. On the theoretical side, conven-
tional job search models imply that higher unemployment bene￿ts and longer potential eligibility for
bene￿ts will raise the average duration of unemployment (e.g., Mortensen 1977, Mortensen 1986).
Most search models assume risk neutrality and ignore savings, and thus do not study wealth e⁄ects
(i.e., the e⁄ects of cash-on-hand). A few studies have incorporated an intertemporal consumption
decision, and derived conditions under which increases in wealth lower search intensity (Danforth,
1979; Lentz and Tranaes, 2005). On the empirical side, a number of well-known studies have shown
that the duration of unemployment is a⁄ected by the generosity and potential duration of UI ben-
e￿ts (e.g., Meyer 1990, Katz and Meyer 1990, Lalive and Zweimuller 2004, Lalive et. al. 2006).
These studies have generally assumed that the entire response of search behavior to UI bene￿ts is
due to moral hazard (a substitution e⁄ect) rather than wealth e⁄ects. Chetty (2006b) points out
that the wealth e⁄ects of UI bene￿ts may be non-trivial when agents have limited liquidity. He
decomposes the UI bene￿t elasticity into a wealth e⁄ect and substitution e⁄ect by examining the
heterogeneity of duration-bene￿t elasticities across liquidity constrained and unconstrained groups
in the U.S. His results imply that a substantial portion of the UI bene￿t e⁄ect is a wealth e⁄ect,
consistent with our ￿ndings here. Relative to existing studies in this literature, the key advantages
of our approach are the use of an exogenous source of variation in wealth to estimate wealth e⁄ects,
and the use of these estimates to distinguish between dynamic models of household behavior.
Our work also contributes to the literature on the job quality gains from prolonged search.
5Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) estimate a positive e⁄ect of UI bene￿t levels on average wages at the
next job using cross-sectional variation in replacement rates. In contrast, Classen (1977) found
that increases in UI bene￿ts legislated by certain states in the U.S. had little or no e⁄ect on wages
at the next job. Subsequent studies have also found mixed and often fragile results: see Burtless
(1990) and Cox and Oaxaca (1990) for reviews and Addison and Blackburn (2000) and Centeno
(2004) for more recent analysis. This literature remains unsettled largely because of the absence
of compelling variation in bene￿t policies. Our analysis yields more credible and precise estimates
of match quality gains than earlier studies, re￿ ecting our RD research design and the large panel
used for the analysis.
Finally, our study is related to the extensive literature on optimal social insurance (e.g. Baily
1978, Flemming 1978, Hansen and Imrohoroglu 1992, Wang and Williamson 1996, Acemoglu and
Shimer 1999, Chetty 2006a, Shimer and Werning 2006). While we do not analyze an optimal social
insurance problem here, we provide a new estimate of the extent to which households can smooth
consumption, a central parameter in such analyses.
III A Job Search Model
We begin by presenting a simple job search model that provides an organizing framework for our
empirical analysis. We use the model to characterize the comparative statics of search behavior,
and to construct a moment that can be used to test between competing intertemporal models.
Model Setup. Our model is closely based on Lentz and Tranaes (2005), who incorporate
savings decisions in a job search model with variable search intensity. We make a few assumptions
to simplify the presentation. First, we assume that all jobs last inde￿nitely once found (i.e. there
is no subsequent job destruction). Second, anticipating our empirical ￿ndings, we assume that
wages are exogenously ￿xed, eliminating reservation-wage choices. We discuss the implications of
relaxing these assumptions at the end of this section.
Consider a discrete-time setting where individuals have a ￿nite planning horizon and a subjective
time discount rate of ￿. Let r denote the ￿xed interest rate in the economy. Flow utility in period
t is given by u(ct)￿ (st), where ct represents consumption in the period, st denotes search e⁄ort,
and the functions u and   are strictly concave and convex, respectively.4 Normalize st to equal
4This formulation assumes within-period separability between consumption and search e⁄ort. Aguiar and Hurst
(2005) present evidence that separable utility is consistent with expenditure patterns during unemployment spells
(but not retirement). See Lentz and Tranaes (2005) for a discussion of the e⁄ects of non-separability in search
models.
6the probability of ￿nding a job in the current period. Abstracting from on-the-job search, assume
st = 0 if the individual is employed in period t.
Assume that the agent becomes unemployed at t = 0. An agent who enters a period t without
a job ￿rst chooses search intensity st, and immediately learns if he or she has obtained a job. If
search is successful, the agent begins working in that period at a ￿xed real wage w that persists
inde￿nitely. Let ce
t denote the agent￿ s optimal consumption choice in period t if a job is found
in that period.5 If the agent fails to ￿nd a job in period t, he receives an unemployment bene￿t
bt and sets consumption to cu
t . The agent then enters period t + 1 unemployed and the problem
repeats.
Optimal Search Intensity. The value function for an individual who ￿nds a job at the beginning
of period t, conditional on beginning the period with assets At is
Vt(At) = max
At+1￿L




where L is a lower bound on assets that may or may not be binding. The value function for an
individual who fails to ￿nd a job at the beginning of period t and remains unemployed is:
Ut(At) = max
At+1￿L




where Jt+1(At+1) is the value of entering the next period unemployed. It is easy to show that
Vt is concave because the agent faces a deterministic pie-eating problem once re-employed. The
function Ut, however, can be convex. Lentz and Tranaes (2005) address this problem by introducing
a wealth lottery that can be played prior to the choice of search intensity whenever U is non-concave,
although they note that in simulations of the model, non-concavity never arises. We shall simply
assume that U is concave.
The agent chooses st to maximize expected utility at the beginning of period t, taking into
account the cost of search:
Jt(At) = max
st
stVt(At) + (1 ￿ st)Ut(At) ￿  (st) (3)
5Note that if the agent found a job in an earlier period, consumption in period t may not equal c
e
t.
7The ￿rst order condition for optimal search intensity is
 0(s￿
t) = Vt(At) ￿ Ut(At) (4)
re￿ ecting the fact that the agent chooses st to equate the marginal cost of search e⁄ort with the
marginal value of search e⁄ort, which is given by the di⁄erence between the optimized values of
employment and unemployment.
Our testable predictions and empirical analysis follow from the comparative statics of equation
(4). First consider the e⁄ect of the UI bene￿t level on search e⁄ort. Di⁄erentiating equation (4)




t) < 0 (5)
Equation (5) is the standard result that higher unemployment bene￿ts reduce search e⁄ort, thereby
increasing unemployment durations. Consistent with this prediction, many well-known studies
have found that increases in UI bene￿ts raise the duration of joblessness. This prediction does
not distinguish between alternative models of household behavior, however, because higher bene￿ts
increase durations regardless of the degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing. To distinguish
between the models of interest, we therefore turn to other comparative static implications of (4)
that we can examine in our empirical setting.
Prediction 1: Severance Pay. The e⁄ect of an exogenous cash grant, such as a severance pay-





t) ￿ 0 (6)
Equation (6) shows that the e⁄ect of a cash grant on search intensity is determined by the gap in
marginal utilities between employed and unemployed states, which is proportional to the size of
consumption drop ce
t ￿ cu
t . Intuitively, when consumption is smooth across states, a cash grant
increases the value of being employed and unemployed by a similar amount, and thus does not
a⁄ect search behavior much. In contrast, if consumption is substantially lower when unemployed,
the cash grant raises the value of being unemployed relative to the value of being employed, leading
to a reduction in search e⁄ort.
It is well known that if an agent has access to complete state-contingent insurance markets, and
8insurers can specify the agent￿ s actions in each state, then cu
t = ce
t.6 In such a setting @s￿
t=@At = 0.
Thus, testing whether lump-sum severance pay has an e⁄ect on unemployment durations constitutes
a test of the full insurance model. More generally, if cu
t is close to ce
t, as in a permanent income
model with unrestricted borrowing, the asset e⁄ect is small. In contrast, if individuals face asset
constraints or voluntarily reduce cu
t to maintain a bu⁄er stock of savings, the asset e⁄ect will be
relatively large. Thus, there is a direct connection between the responsiveness of search intensity
to an increase in wealth and the amount of consumption smoothing implied by an intertemporal
model.
An estimate of @s￿
t=@At is also useful in assessing the degree of moral hazard caused by tem-











Equation (7) shows that the response of search intensity to an increase in unemployment bene￿ts
can be written as the sum of a pure wealth e⁄ect and a price (or substitution) e⁄ect The former
has no direct e¢ ciency costs, whereas the latter represents a ￿moral hazard￿ response to the
price distortion induced by subsidizing unemployment. Many empirical studies of unemployment
insurance ignore the asset e⁄ect by assuming that unemployment durations depend on the ratio
of bene￿ts to wages. These studies implicitly assume that the PIH with complete markets model
applies. To the extent that job seekers have lower consumption when unemployed, however, one
should expect bene￿ts to have a larger impact (in absolute value) than wages.7
Prediction 2: Extended Bene￿ts. Next, we examine how search intensity in period t is a⁄ected




t+j)]=[(1 + ￿)j 00(s￿





t+j) is the probability that an individual is still unemployed in
6The ability to specify the agent￿ s actions in all states is important because a fully insured agent has no incentive
to search.
7Interestingly, this pattern is present in the well-known study by Meyer (1990), whose estimates imply that the
e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts on the hazard rate of leaving unemployment is about 1.8 times larger than the e⁄ect of weekly
earnings.
9period t+j (conditional on being unemployed at t). This equation implies that a rise in the future
bene￿t rate lowers search intensity in the current period, with a magnitude that varies inversely
with the discount factor (1 + ￿)j. For a completely myopic agent, ￿ = 1, and hence equation (8)
implies that @s￿
t=@bt+j = 0. Thus, testing whether increasing bene￿t levels in the future has an
e⁄ect on the current search behavior constitutes a test of the ￿rule of thumb￿(complete myopia)
model.
Prediction 3: Future Job Quality. A ￿nal set of predictions that are useful in distinguishing
between alternative models concern the e⁄ects of assets and unemployment bene￿ts on the expected
quality of the next job. The model presented here makes no predictions about job match quality
because we have assumed that wages are ￿xed and agents only control search intensity. In a more
general model with a non-degenerate distribution of wages or job qualities, however, an increase in
assets or future bene￿ts can potentially lead to a rise in the optimal reservation wage (Danforth
1979) and an increase in the average quality of the next job.
A Moment for Calibration. We now combine equations (6) and (8) to form a predicted moment
that can be used to calibrate and test a broad set of intertemporal decision-making models. In
particular, consider the ratio of the e⁄ects of assets and future unemployment bene￿ts on search
intensity at the beginning of a spell (period 0). To simplify notation, let p￿
j = p￿
j;0 denote the
probability that an individual is still unemployed j periods after job loss. Since the present
expected value of UI bene￿ts j periods in the future is proportional to the probability that an
individual actually receives those bene￿ts (p￿
j), it is convenient to re-scale the e⁄ect of an increase
in future bene￿ts by this probability ￿that is, consider 1
p￿
j @s￿
























The moment mj can be easily simulated in models of household behavior because it requires










0 ). If the path of
10consumption is ￿ at during unemployment ￿as is approximately true for the PIH ￿then Zj = 1,
and only the initial consumption drop has to be calculated. Importantly, the value of mj does not
depend on the   function.8 This feature of mj signi￿cantly expands the scope of models that can
be calibrated using this moment, as we discuss below. The value of mj is also of direct interest
because the ratio D is a su¢ cient statistic for determining the marginal bene￿ts of unemployment
insurance in a wide class of dynamic models (Chetty 2006a).
Figure 1 shows predicted values of mj for a set of models that di⁄er in assumptions about
preferences and ￿nancial technologies. The models on the left side of the continuum assume a
higher degree of intertemporal smoothing by households, and thus predict a lower sensitivity of
search behavior to cash-on-hand. At the left extreme of the continuum is the full insurance model,
where temporary income shocks have no e⁄ect on behavior (i.e., mj = 0). At the right extreme is
a ￿complete myopia￿model where households do not smooth intertemporally at all, and simply set
current consumption equal to current income. In this model, severance pay a⁄ects search e⁄ort
substantially but bene￿t extensions have no e⁄ect, implying mj = 1. The interior of the continuum
includes models that have intermediate values of mj 2 (0;1): the PIH with unrestricted borrowing
but no insurance, bu⁄er stock models (Deaton 1991; Carroll 1997), and a credit-constraint model
where agents are forward looking but face a binding asset constraint.
In section VIII, we calculate predicted values of m2 shown in Figure 1 for the PIH and credit-
constrained cases. We then compare these values with an empirical estimate of m2, constructed
from estimates of the e⁄ect of severance pay and extended bene￿ts on job-￿nding hazards. This
exercise can be loosely interpreted as a means of identifying the ￿location￿of the representative
household in the data on the continuum in Figure 1. More precisely, the moment mj de￿nes a
plane within the space of parameters de￿ned by preferences and ￿nancial technologies (e.g. the
asset limit, insurance market completeness, discount rate, risk aversion, prudence). Of course,
a single moment is insu¢ cient to pin down all of these parameters, but it does turn out to be
su¢ cient to distinguish between certain benchmark cases.
Extensions. The formula for mj in (9) holds in a more general class of search models than
the one we have presented. Consider for example a model with wage uncertainty, where agents
choose a reservation wage in addition to search intensity and consumption. In such a model,
the expression for the value function for an unemployed agent Ut(At) will be more complex, and
8The function   can be left unspeci￿ed because we have assumed separability between consumption and job search
e⁄ort. Extending the analysis to models with non-separability is an interesting direction for further work.
11will depend on the reservation wage and the distribution of wage o⁄ers. However, the ￿rst order







t ) also remain valid, since the reservation wage is chosen optimally. Thus,
equation (9) holds in a model with endogenous reservation wages.9
Similarly, consider a model where jobs do not last inde￿nitely. This modi￿cation changes the
functional form of Vt(At), but the key ￿rst order condition (4) and envelope conditions still apply.
Thus, equation (9) holds in this model as well. A third extension allows the productivity of job
search to decrease as the spell elapses. At the start of a spell of unemployment, searchers can
sample from the stock of existing vacancies; once they have exhausted their most promising leads,
they are left with the ￿ ow of vacancies and thus search becomes less productive (as in McCall￿ s
(1990) sequential search model). This extension would have no e⁄ect on our predictions for the
relative e⁄ects of assets and future bene￿ts on search intensity at the beginning of the spell.10
The explanation for the generality of (9) is straightforward. Since a job searcher is optimally
allocating consumption over time, marginal welfare changes from severance pay or extended bene￿ts
can always be evaluated by assuming that increases in assets or bene￿ts are allocated to increased
consumption in the period of receipt (i.e., by using the envelope conditions for the value functions
associated with employment and unemployment). Since the ratio mj is fully determined by the
marginal utilities of consumption in di⁄erent states and periods, equation (9) does not depend on
the speci￿c structure of the model. Of course, the predicted values of mj will depend on the
structure of the model: for example, the mj implied by a reservation-wage model may di⁄er from a
pure search intensity model because the implied values of ce
0 and cu
0 will generally di⁄er in the two
models. However, the predictions we test and the calibration methodology are robust to model
speci￿cation.
IV Institutional Background and Data
The Austrian labor market is characterized by an unusual combination of institutional regulation
and ￿ exibility. Virtually all private sector jobs are covered by collective bargaining agreements,
9A caveat in calibrating the reservation wage model using (9) is that the observed e⁄ects of severance pay or UI
bene￿ts on the duration of joblessness include the combined e⁄ects on search intensity and the job acceptance rate.
10In the baseline model with constant productivity of search, job-￿nding rates rise over time because assets and
consumption fall as the spell elapses (Lentz and Tranaes 2005). This counterfactual prediction can be resolved by
allowing for decreasing productivity of search. Speci￿cally, let pt(s) represent the probabability of ￿nding a job






t) = Vt(At) ￿ Ut(At). In this case, the observed job ￿nding rate pt(s
￿
t) can fall over time even
though assets are falling as well.
12negotiated by unions and employer associations at the region and industry level (EIRO 2001).
Firms with more than 5 employees are also required to consult with their works councils in the
event of a layo⁄ and to give at least 6 weeks notice of a pending layo⁄ (Stiglbauer et al. 2003).
Despite these features, rates of job turnover are relatively high and the unemployment rate is
relatively low. Stiglbauer et al. (2003), for example, show that rates of ￿job creation￿and ￿job
destruction￿for most sectors and the overall economy are comparable to those in the U.S. The
average unemployment rate over the 1993-2004 period was among the lowest in Europe at 4.1%.
A key aspect of the ￿ring regulations in Austria is severance pay, which was introduced for white
collar workers in 1921 and expanded to all other workers in 1979. Severance payments are made by
￿rms according to a ￿xed rule legislated by the government. In particular, workers outside of the
construction industry who are laid o⁄ after 3 years of service must be given a lump sum severance
payment equal to 2 months of their previous salary.11 Payments are generally made within one
month of the job termination, and are exempt from social security taxes.
Job losers with su¢ cient work history are also eligible for unemployment bene￿ts. Speci￿cally,
individuals who have worked for 12 months or more in the two years preceding job loss are eligible
for UI bene￿ts that replace approximately 55% of their prior net wage, subject to a minimum and
maximum (though only a small fraction of individuals are at maximum). Workers who are laid
o⁄ by their employer are immediately eligible for bene￿ts, while those who quit or are ￿red for
cause have a four week waiting period. The maximum duration of regular unemployment bene￿ts
is a discontinuous function of the total number of months that the individual worked (at any ￿rm)
within the past ￿ve years. Individuals with less than 36 months of employment in the past 5
years receive 20 weeks of bene￿ts, while those who have worked for 36 months or more receive 30
weeks of bene￿ts (which we term ￿extended bene￿ts￿ ).12 Job losers who exhaust their regular
unemployment bene￿ts can move to a means-tested secondary bene￿t, known as ￿unemployment
assistance,￿(UA) which pays a lower level of bene￿ts inde￿nitely. UA bene￿ts are reduced euro-
for-euro by the amount of any other family income. As a result, the average UA replacement rate
is 38% of the UI bene￿t level in the population (see the appendix for details of this calculation).
11The severance amount rises to 3 months of pay for workers with 5 years of service, 4 months after 10 years, and
up to 12 months after 25 years of service. Employees who quit or are ￿red for cause are not eligible for severance
pay. Workers in the construction industry are covered by a di⁄erent law. The law governing severance pay was
changed in January 2003 (outside our sample).
12Starting in 1989, job losers over the age of 40 who worked at least 312 weeks (6 years) in the past 10 years were
eligible for 39 weeks of bene￿ts. Additional bene￿ts are available for people over 50, who are excluded from our
analysis. Apart from the change in the bene￿ts for those age 40-49, there were no other changes in the UI eligibility
or bene￿t formulas over our sample period.
13The UI and UA systems are ￿nanced through payroll taxes, and are not experience-rated. Receipt
of severance pay does not a⁄ect the unemployment bene￿t amount.
Our empirical analysis exploits the discontinuities in the severance pay and bene￿t duration
laws to identify the causal e⁄ects of these two entitlements on search behavior. The e⁄ects of the
two policies can be independently identi￿ed because they are discontinuous functions of di⁄erent
running variables: job tenure in the case of severance pay, and months worked in the past 5 years
in the case of extended bene￿ts. Nevertheless, there is a subset of individuals ￿those who did
not work in the two years prior to their current job ￿for whom the severance pay and extended
UI bene￿t discontinuities overlap. This creates a ￿double discontinuity￿ that complicates the
empirical analysis relative to the standard regression discontinuity design proposed by Thistlewaite
and Campbell (1960), where there is only one discontinuous policy change.
Figure 2a illustrates the double discontinuity issue by plotting the fraction of individuals in our
data who receive an extended unemployment bene￿t (EB) as a function of months of job tenure.
Individuals who have 36 or more months of job tenure necessarily have worked for more than 3 of
the last 5 years; hence the fraction receiving EB is 100% on the right side of the severance pay
discontinuity. Individuals who have 35 months of job tenure receive EB if they worked for one
month or more at another ￿rm within the past ￿ve years. Since only 80% of individuals laid o⁄
with 35 months of job tenure satisfy this condition, there is a 20 percentage point jump the fraction
receiving EB at 36 months of job tenure. Consequently, any discontinuous change in behavior
at 36 months of job tenure is mainly due to severance pay, but includes a small (20 percentage
point) e⁄ect of extended bene￿ts. A similar double discontinuity arises at the threshold for EB, as
shown in Figure 2b. The fraction of individuals receiving severance pay jumps discontinuously by
approximately 20% at 36 months worked. Hence changes in behavior around 36 months worked
are likely to be caused primarily by EB, but could also be partly attributed to severance pay.
We account for the double discontinuity in our empirical analysis using two independent methods
described below.
IV.A Data and Sample De￿nition
We use data from the Austrian social security registry, which covers all workers except for the
self-employed and civil servants. Approximately 85% of the Austrian workforce is covered by
the dataset. We consider all layo⁄ events between 1981 and 2001. The dataset includes daily
information on employment and registered unemployment status, total wages received from each
14employer in a calendar year, and information on workers￿ and ￿rms￿ characteristics (e.g. age,
education, gender, marital status, industry, and ￿rm size). Further details on the database are
given in the appendix.
The dataset does not have any information on actual severance payments or the amount of UI
bene￿ts paid. Hence, we cannot construct ￿￿rst stage￿estimates of the e⁄ect of the discontinuous
policies on actual payments received. Compliance with the severance pay law is believed to be
nearly universal, in part because of the monitoring e⁄ort of works councils and legal penalties
for violations (CESifo 2004; Baker Tilly International, 2005). Given our data source, we also
believe we have accurately captured the eligibility rules for extended bene￿ts. Consequently, the
eligibility rules for both severance pay and EB￿ s create so-called ￿sharp￿regression discontinuity
designs, where the fraction eligible jumps from 0 to 1 at the discontinuity (Hahn, Todd, and van
der Klaauw 2001).
We make four restrictions on the original dataset to arrive at our primary analysis sample.
First, we include only non-construction workers between the ages of 20 and 50 at the time of the
job termination, to avoid complications with the retirement system, special UI regulations for older
workers (Winter-Ebmer 2003), and the di⁄erential treatment of construction workers. Second, we
include only individuals who take up UI bene￿ts within 28 days of job loss, thereby eliminating
voluntary quitters (who are ineligible for severance pay and have a 28 day waiting period for UI
eligibility). Third, we focus on individuals around the discontinuities of interest by only including
individuals who worked at their previous ￿rm for between 1 and 5 years, and who worked between
1 and 5 years of the past 5 years. Consequently, everyone in the sample is eligible for UI bene￿ts
(though not all are eligible for extended bene￿ts), and everyone in the sample is eligible for either
2 months of severance pay or none. Finally, we drop individuals who were recalled to their prior
￿rm in order to eliminate temporary layo⁄s who may not be searching for a job. These restrictions
leave us with a sample of 650,922 unemployment spells.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the full sample. Sixty percent of the sample has additional
schooling beyond the compulsory level, mainly apprenticeship training. Only 44 percent of the
sample are married, re￿ ecting relatively the relatively young age of the sample and the prevalence
of non-marital cohabitation in Austria. Owing to our sample requirement that people have worked
between 1 and 5 years at their last job, average tenure is relatively short (26.5 months). However,
most people have worked at other jobs in the past 5 years: the mean numbers of months worked
is 41.2. Roughly one-￿fth of the sample is eligible for severance pay, while 66% are eligible for
15extended UI bene￿ts. The mean wage is 17,034 Euros per year in year 2000 Euros.13 Wages are
top-coded at the social security tax cap in the dataset. However, this cap binds for only a small
fraction of individuals in our sample (less than 2%).
There are two measures of unemployment durations that can be constructed in the data. The
￿rst is the total number of days that an individual is registered with the unemployment agency.
Individuals are required to register while they are receiving bene￿ts, and can remain registered
even when their bene￿ts are exhausted in order to take advantage of job training and job search
assistance services o⁄ered by the agency. This measure corresponds to the o¢ cial de￿nition
of ￿unemployment￿ in government statistics, and we therefore refer to it below simply as the
individual￿ s ￿unemployment duration.￿ Spells of registered unemployment are relatively short: the
median spell length is less than 3 months, 64% of spells end within 20 weeks, and 94% end within
a year. Note that 0.5% of the unemployment durations are censored; the statistics in Table 1 do
not adjust for censoring.
The second measure of the duration of job search, which we label ￿nonemployment duration,￿
is the amount of time that elapses from the end of the previous job to the start of the next job.
Although 92% of the sample is observed in a next job, some people lose a job and never return
to the data set, leading to a tail of extremely long censored durations.14 As a result, the median
nonemployment duration is 4.3 months while the mean is nearly 17 months (again, not adjusting
for censoring). 51% of individuals ￿nd a new job within 20 weeks, and 77% ￿nd a new job within
one year.
We use the nonemployment duration measure as our primary measure of duration of joblessness
in our analysis for two reasons. First, the nonemployment measure captures actual transitions from
a lost job to a new job, which corresponds most directly to the notion of ￿labor supply￿in our job
search model. Second, the unemployment measure can be mechanically a⁄ected by the program￿ s
parameters. For example, the extension of bene￿ts from 20 weeks to 30 weeks can mechanically
raise unemployment durations even if it has no impact on job ￿nding rates. A drawback of the
nonemployment duration measure is that it assumes that all nonemployed individuals are still
searching for a job, whereas some may have exited the sample (to take a job outside the country, or
in the government sector) or left the labor force temporarily (e.g. to receive training).15 To evaluate
13This is the gross wage: wages are subject to a payroll tax of approximately 30 percent.
14These individuals may take a job as a civil servant or become self-employed (occupations not covered by our
dataset), leave the country (to work in Germany or Switzerland), or simply drop out of the labor force.
15Since we restrict our sample to those who take up UI, permanent labor force leavers should in principle be
excluded. This facilitates the use of nonemployment duration as a measure of search duration.
16the robustness of our ￿ndings, we replicate our analysis using the unemployment duration measure,
coding the duration as censored if there is a gap between the end of the registered unemployment
spell and the start of the next job. As shown below, the two alternative measures of joblessness
lead to very similar results, indicating that the ￿ndings are robust to the way in which the duration
of ￿search￿is measured.
The ￿nal row of the table summarizes the change in log (real) wage between the old and new
jobs. The median wage growth rate is -0.7%, while the mean is -3.4%. However, there is substantial
dispersion in the wage growth distribution (standard deviation = 51%).16 This suggests that there
is considerable scope for a given worker to earn higher or lower wages within the Austrian economy,
a point relevant in evaluating the search outcome results in section VII.
V Estimation Strategy and Identi￿cation Assumptions
Our identi￿cation strategy is to exploit the quasi-experiment created by the Austrian severance pay
and extended bene￿t laws using a regression discontinuity (RD) approach. We begin by describing
the approach for identifying the causal e⁄ect of severance pay on durations, ignoring extended
bene￿ts. Consider the following model of the relationship between the duration of unemployment
(y) and a dummy variable S which is equal to 1 if he or she receives severance pay and 0 otherwise:
y = ￿ + S￿sp + ". (10)
The parameter of interest is the coe¢ cient ￿sp, which measures the causal e⁄ect of severance pay
on y. The problem for inference is that eligibility for severance pay is non-random. In particular,
workers who are more likely to have a long enough job tenure (JT) to be eligible for severance pay
may have other unobserved characteristics that also a⁄ect their unemployment duration:
E["jJT] 6= 0:
16The wage at a given employer is de￿ned as total earnings from that employer over the calendar year divided by
days worked at that employer during the calendar year, multiplied by 365. The earnings growth measure thus adjusts
for di⁄erences in days worked across jobs, but does not adjust for di⁄erences in hours worked per day. Therefore,
part of the dispersion in earnings growth may be due to variation in hours worked per day.
17Since S is a function of JT, this can lead to a bias in the direct estimation of ￿sp in equation (10)
using OLS. This bias can be overcome if
lim
￿!0+ E["jJT = 36 + ￿] = lim
￿!0+ E["jJT = 36 ￿ ￿]; (11)
i.e., if the distribution of unobserved characteristics of people with job tenure just slightly under
36 months is the same as the distribution among those with tenure just slightly over 36 months.
In this case, the control function f(JT) de￿ned by
E["jJT] = f(JT);
is continuous at JT = 36. Thus, one can augment equation (10) with the control function, leading
to:
y = ￿ + S￿sp + f(JT) + ￿ (12)
where ￿ ￿ "￿E["jJT] is mean independent of S. Moreover, since S is a discontinuous function of
job tenure, whereas the control function is by assumption continuous at 36 months, the coe¢ cient
￿sp is identi￿ed. Intuitively, any discontinuous relation between job tenure and duration at 36
months can be attributed to the causal impact of a severance payment under the identi￿cation
assumption in (11).
In practice, the control function f(JT) is unknown and has to be approximated by some smooth
￿ exible function, such as a low-order polynomial (e.g., Angrist and Lavy 1999, Dinardo and Lee
2005). We follow this approach and use a third or fourth order polynomial, allowing the linear
and higher order terms to be interacted with a dummy for tenure over 36 months.
Selection Around the Discontinuity. One may be concerned about the validity of the identi￿ca-
tion assumption in (11) because ￿rms have an incentive to ￿re workers prior to the 36 month cuto⁄
to avoid the costs of severance payments. Such selective ￿ring could invalidate the RD research
design by creating discontinuous di⁄erences in workers￿characteristics to the left and right of the
cuto⁄.
Although the continuity assumption cannot be fully tested, its validity can be evaluated by
checking whether the frequency of layo⁄s and the means of observable characteristics trend smoothly
with job tenure through the 36 month threshold (Lee 2006). As a ￿rst check, Figure 3 shows
18the number of job losers entering unemployment, by months of job tenure.17 There is no evidence
of a spike in layo⁄s at 35 months, nor of a relative shortfall in the number of people who are laid
o⁄ just after the threshold, suggesting that employers do not in fact selectively time their ￿ring
decisions to avoid the costs of severance pay.18 Given that such strategic behavior is illegal, and
the fact that each layo⁄must be approved by the ￿rm￿ s works council, this is perhaps unsurprising.
Moreover, ￿rms that continually ￿re workers just before the eligibility threshold would presumably
pay a price through reputation e⁄ects. Cases in which ￿rms are perceived to have deliberately
￿red employees to avoid paying severance have led to lawsuits and coverage in the media.
Next, we check for potential di⁄erences in sample composition around the 36 month threshold
by examining how observable characteristics vary with job tenure. Figure 4a plots average age
in each tenure-month cell by job tenure, and shows that there is no evidence of selection on age.
Figure 4b conducts a similar analysis on the mean wages of those laid o⁄ at di⁄erent tenures. In
this case there is a small but statistically signi￿cant jump in mean wages at the discontinuity,
indicating that higher-wage employees are relatively more likely to be laid o⁄ just after 36 months
than just before. While this is potentially worrisome for our research design, it is important to
distinguish between economic and statistical signi￿cance in a dataset of this size. The jump in the
best-￿t lines shown in Figure 4b is approximately 300 Euros/year, or about 1.6% of the mean wage
for people with 35 months of tenure.19 This small discontinuity is only statistically detectable
because of the sample size and the relatively precise wage measures available in our data. We ￿nd
similar results ￿either statistically insigni￿cant e⁄ects or small but signi￿cant discontinuities ￿for
other observables such as education, industry, occupation, previous ￿rm size, duration of last job,
last nonemployment duration, and month/year of job loss.
The degree of potential bias from the small amount of selection on wages and other charac-
teristics can be assessed by estimating the e⁄ect of these covariates on unemployment durations.
Intuitively, unless the correlation between wages and unemployment durations is very large, a
17In this and all other ￿gures, we de￿ne a ￿month￿as a period of 31 days. We de￿ne the months starting from
the discontinuity (3 years = 1096 days), counting 31 day intervals on the left and the right. Because of this counting
convention and our sample restriction of having between 1 and 5 years of job tenure and months worked, the month
groups 12 and 59 contain less than 10 days. Therefore, we exclude these points from the ￿gures and only plot values
for months 13 to 58. In the regression analysis, all time variables are analyzed at a daily level, and the small number
of observations that fall into months 12 and 59 are included as well.
18Some people who are laid o⁄ move directly to another job without an intervening spell of unemployment. We
examined the frequency distribution of the total number of layo⁄s at each value of previous job tenure, and found
no evidence of a spike at 36 months. We also examined the probability that a laid o⁄ person ￿led for UI (and thus
appears in our data set). This probability also evolves smoothly through the 36 month threshold.
19Note that higher wage workers have shorter unemployment durations in our data. This small amount of selection
should therefore, if anything, work against ￿nding a positive e⁄ect of severance pay on durations.
19small discontinuity in wages (or any unobserved characteristic correlated with wages) cannot lead
to much bias in the estimated e⁄ect of severance pay on search durations. To quantify the potential
bias, we estimate the e⁄ect of wages and other covariates on re-employment hazards using a Cox
proportional-hazards speci￿cation for nonemployment durations:
hd = ￿d exp(X￿)
where hd denotes the re-employment hazard on day d of the spell for a given individual, ￿d is
an unrestricted ￿day e⁄ect￿ (i.e., the ￿baseline￿ hazard), and X denotes a rich set of observed
characteristics, including demographics, previous work history and wages, and region and time
e⁄ects.20 We then predict the relative hazard for each observation i, b ri = exp(Xb ￿), using the
estimated b ￿ vector. Finally, we compute the means of the predicted relative hazards by month of
job tenure, E[b rijJT] and plot this function, looking for any indication that the average predicted
hazard is di⁄erent for those laid o⁄ before or after the eligibility threshold.
Figure 4c shows the results of this exercise. The predicted relative hazards trend downward
across the chart, indicating that individuals with higher job tenure have observable characteristics
associated with longer durations. However, the predicted hazards are smooth through the 36
month threshold, showing that the small discontinuities in the observable covariates have little
net impact on nonemployment durations. Importantly, the X0s included in the construction of
Figure 4c include endogenous variables such as wages and the durations of prior spells of work
and unemployment. These variables are likely to pick up any unobserved characteristics that are
correlated with search behavior. Hence, if people laid o⁄ just before the 36 month threshold are
systematically di⁄erent on unobservables than those laid o⁄ just after 36 months, we would expect
a jump in the hazard predicted by the endogenous observables. Since there is no such jump in
Figure 4c, we conclude that individuals are ￿nearly randomized￿around JT = 36, implying that
any discontinuity in search behavior at this point can be attributed to the causal e⁄ect of severance
pay.21
20The complete list of regressors is: age, age-squared, gender, education, marital status, Austrian nationality, ￿blue
collar￿ status, log of the previous wage and its square, number of employees at the previous ￿rm, years of work
experience and its square, an indicator for having a job before the one just lost, the duration of the job before the
one just lost, ￿blue collar￿status at job prior to the one lost, a dummy for being recalled to the job before the one
just lost, indicator for having a prior spell of nonemployment, the last nonemployment duration before the current
spell, total number of spells of nonemployment (since the start of the data set), and dummies for industry, region of
residence, month of job loss, and year of job loss.
21We further evaluate the identi￿cation assumption after our main analysis in section VI, by examining subsamples
of the data and implementing a placebo test.
20Our identi￿cation strategy for estimating the e⁄ect of the UI bene￿t extension on durations
is conceptually similar to the strategy for severance pay. Formally, we replace the indicator for
severance pay S in equation (12) with an indicator E for extended bene￿t status, and replace
job tenure with a measure of months worked (MW) in the ￿ve years before the job termination.
Again, the potential problem with a simple regression of unemployment duration on EB status is
that people with a longer work history may be more (or less) likely to ￿nd a job quickly. As in
equation (10), the key assumption that facilitates an RD approach is that the expected value of
unobserved characteristics is the same for people with MW just under 36 months and just over 36
months. We evaluate this assumption by plotting the frequency of layo⁄s, the average values of
various observable covariates, and the predicted unemployment exit hazards against MW. In the
interest of space, we do not report these results here. We ￿nd that there are no discontinuities
in the relative number of layo⁄s, nor in the predicted relative hazard at MW = 36. Moreover,
in contrast to the situation in Figure 4b, there is no signi￿cant jump in mean wages or any other
covariate around MW = 36. Overall, we conclude that the patterns in the data are consistent
with the assumption that EB status is ￿as good as randomly assigned￿among people with values
of MW on either side of the 36 month threshold.
Identi￿cation with Double Discontinuity. As noted above, although severance pay and EB
status depend on di⁄erent running variables, there is a group of people in our sample ￿ those
with only one job in the past 5 years ￿who reach the 36 month eligibility thresholds for the two
programs at the same point. There are two ways to handle the resulting ￿double discontinuity￿
problem. The ￿rst is to analyze a subsample in which the two discontinuities are not overlapping.
To implement this approach, we consider a ￿restricted sample￿of individuals who worked for one
month or more within the past ￿ve years at a ￿rm di⁄erent from the one from which they were
just laid o⁄. Everyone in the restricted sample who has JT ￿ 35 months has MW ￿ 36 and thus
quali￿es for EB. Thus, only severance pay eligibility shifts at JT = 36 in the restricted sample
(the fraction eligible for EB remains constant at 100% around JT = 36). Conversely, as months
worked approaches 36 months, no one in the subsample has yet worked 36 months at the same
employer. Thus, only EB status shifts at MW = 36 in the restricted sample. The separation of
the two discontinuities permits the use of conventional single-variable RD methods to identify the
severance and EB e⁄ects in the restricted sample.
An alternative approach to separating the two e⁄ects, which can be applied in the full sample, is
to explicitly model the joint e⁄ects of severance pay and extended bene￿ts. Consider the extended
21model
y = ￿ + S￿sp + E￿eb + " (13)
where S and E are indicators for severance pay and EB eligibility, respectively.22 As in the single
discontinuity case, the problem for inference is that the unobserved determinants of y may be
correlated with JT and/or MW. De￿ne the control function g(JT;MW) as
E["jJT;MW] = g(JT;MW):
The key assumption needed is that g(JT;MW) is continuous at JT = 36 for all values of MW, and
continuous at MW = 36 for all values of JT. Under this identifying assumption, we can augment
equation (13) with the control function
y = ￿ + S￿sp + E￿eb + g(JT;MW) + ￿
where ￿ ￿ " ￿ E["jJT;MW] is mean independent of E and S. Since S and E jump discontinu-
ously at JT = 36 and MW = 36, respectively, and JT and MW are imperfectly correlated, the
coe¢ cients ￿spand ￿eb are identi￿ed controlling for g. We implement this model by assuming as
above that g can be approximated by a low order polynomial of JT and MW.
VI E⁄ects of Cash-on-Hand and Bene￿t Extensions on Durations
This section presents results on the e⁄ect of severance pay and UI bene￿t extensions on durations.
We begin with a graphical overview and then estimate a set of hazard models to obtain numerical
measures of the elasticities of interest.
VI.A Graphical Results
Severance Pay. We begin our analysis in Figure 5a by plotting mean nonemployment durations
vs. months of job tenure. For simplicity, in this ￿gure we ignore censoring (e⁄ectively treating
all measured durations as complete), and exclude all observations with a nonemployment duration
of more than two years to eliminate the long right tail of the distribution. For visual reference,
we superimpose a quadratic regression model ￿t separately to points on the right and left of the
22Note that (13) does not include an interaction e⁄ect between S and EB. While in principle we would like to
allow for an interaction between the two policies, in practice everyone with S = 1 has EB = 1. Hence the interaction
cannot be identi￿ed.
22eligibility threshold. The ￿gure shows a clearly discernible jump of about 10 days in the average
nonemployment duration at the threshold.
We cannot attribute the entire gap in Figure 5a to the e⁄ects of severance pay because the
fraction of individuals receiving EB also jumps at the cuto⁄. To isolate the pure e⁄ect of severance
pay, we focus on the ￿restricted sample￿ ￿ individuals who worked for at least one month at
another ￿rm within the past ￿ve years ￿where the two discontinuities are not overlapping. Figure
5b replicates Figure 5a for this sample. This ￿gure shows a jump in the mean nonemployment
duration of approximately 8 days at the 36 month cuto⁄, con￿rming that most of the 10 day gap
in Figure 5a is indeed caused by the severance payment.
Given the censoring of nonemployment spells, a more precise way to measure the e⁄ect of sever-
ance pay on search behavior is to examine how the job ￿nding (re-employment) hazard rate changes
at the severance pay eligibility threshold. Figure 6 presents such an analysis. In constructing
this ￿gure, we include all nonemployment spells and adjust the hazards for censoring. We focus
on the re-employment hazard in the ￿rst 20 weeks ￿the period of interest from the perspective of
testing between models since it includes only the time before the bene￿t extension ￿by censoring
all observations at 140 days. To obtain an estimate of the average re-employment hazard for
people with di⁄erent months of previous job tenure, we ￿t a Cox proportional-hazards model with
dummies for each tenure group. We adjust for the double discontinuity problem by including cubic
polynomials in months worked, a dummy for extended bene￿t eligibility, and their interaction:
hd = ￿d expf￿13I(J = 13) + ::: + ￿34I(J = 34) + ￿36I(J = 36) + ::: + ￿58I(J = 58) (14)
+ ￿ ￿ E + ￿1MW + ￿2MW2 + ￿3MW3
+ ￿E
1 E ￿ (MW ￿ 36) + ￿E
2 E ￿ (MW ￿ 36)2 + ￿E
3 E ￿ (MW ￿ 36)3g:
The key coe¢ cients of interest in this speci￿cation are the ￿Js, which measure the percentage
di⁄erence between average daily hazard for people with J months of previous job tenure and those
with 35 months of tenure (the omitted group). Figure 6a plots the estimated ￿Js from equation
(14). Consistent with the results in Figure 5, there is a discontinuous drop of approximately 10%
in the average hazard rate at the severance pay discontinuity. Since the estimated relative hazards
in this ￿gure are adjusted for the EB e⁄ect, the entire jump in this ￿gure can be attributed to the
23e⁄ect of severance pay in the full sample.23
One of the appealing features of a regression discontinuity approach is that estimates of the
discontinuity should be invariant to the presence or absence of control variables (Lee and Card
2006).24 As in a classical experimental design, however, the addition of controls may lead to some
gain in precision. Moreover, a comparison of the estimated discontinuities with and without con-
trols provides an informal speci￿cation test that the underlying smoothness assumptions required
for the RD design are valid. Figure 6b replicates Figure 6a adjusting for observables, by adding
the following covariates to (14): gender, ￿blue collar￿status, marital status, Austrian nationality,
age and its square, the previous log wage and its square, and dummies for month and year of job
loss. As in Figure 6a, the job ￿nding hazard shows about a 10% drop at the 36 month threshold
for receiving severance pay.
A potential concern in Figures 6a and 6b is that there is some seasonality in the hazard rates
associated with job tenure. Close examination of the graphs suggests that the hazard rates in
the last few months of each tenure-year (e.g. months 21-23, 33-35, etc.) are approximately 2.5%
higher than the hazards in the remainder of the tenure-year. One explanation for this pattern is
that individuals who leave a ￿rm shortly before completion of a full year of service are di⁄erent
from those who leave just after. Such di⁄erences may arise because planned terminations are
more likely to take place after a full year of service is complete, or because of features such as
employer-provided pensions that vest after integer numbers of years of service. Since the severance
pay cuto⁄ falls at an integer threshold (three years of tenure), one may be concerned that the
seasonality in hazards biases the RD estimate of the severance pay e⁄ect. To gauge the size of the
potential bias, we estimated a parametric RD model with an ￿end of tenure year￿indicator which
equals 1 in the three months before the end of each tenure year (21-23, 33-35, 45-47, and 57-59).
We then adjusted the average hazards in Figure 6a for seasonality by subtracting the estimated
end of tenure year e⁄ect from the hazard rates at the end of each tenure year.25 Figure 6c plots
the resulting seasonality-adjusted hazards. This ￿gure shows that the seasonality adjustment fully
23We have also implemented a more ￿ exible model by including unrestricted baseline parameters for each tenure
group (permitting ￿Jd to vary freely across tenure-month categories J), and then examining how the average estimated
daily hazard ￿Jd varies with J. This approach yields very similar results to the more restrictive proportional-hazards
approach of equation (14).
24Note that our presentation of the RD method excluded controls. One can think of the " term as including the
e⁄ect of all the characteristics that vary across the sample, including potentially observable as well as unobserved
characteristics.
25More precisely, we estimated speci￿cation 3 in Table 2, adding the ￿end of tenure year￿ indicator. We then
subtracted the coe¢ cient estimate on the indicator from the hazard rates shown in Figure 6a for the last three
months of each tenure-year category (i.e., 21-23, 33-35, etc).
24eliminates the potentially worrisome patterns in Figures 6a and 6b. With this adjustment, the
average hazard rate falls by approximately 8% at the severance pay cuto⁄, indicating that the
results are only slightly a⁄ected by the seasonality pattern.
As noted above, the causal interpretation of our results relies on the identifying assumption
that in the absence of severance pay there would be no systematic di⁄erences in nonemployment
durations between individuals laid o⁄ on either side of the 36 month eligibility threshold. The
rich panel structure of our dataset allows a simple ￿placebo￿ test of this assumption, using the
16% of our sample who we observe with more than one job termination. In particular, if people
who are laid o⁄ after 35 months of tenure are systematically di⁄erent than those laid o⁄ after
36 months, one would expect a discontinuous e⁄ect of job tenure at the job before the one just
lost on the current duration of nonemployment. Figure 7 examines this relationship, and shows
that current nonemployment durations evolve smoothly through the 36 month cuto⁄ for lagged
job tenure, supporting our identi￿cation assumption. Any omitted-variables explanation of our
￿ndings would therefore require that people￿ s unobserved characteristics change over time such that
a discontinuity in nonemployment durations at 36 months emerges only in the current job.
Thus far we have summarized the e⁄ect of severance pay on search behavior in a single statistic,
either mean durations or the average job ￿nding hazard over the ￿rst twenty weeks of the spell. We
now explore how severance pay a⁄ects search behavior as the spell elapses. Figure 8a plots average
weekly job ￿nding hazards for individuals laid o⁄ in tenure-months 33-35 (no severance) and those
laid o⁄ in months 36-38 (who receive severance). This ￿gure is drawn using the restricted sample;
hence, the di⁄erences between the job ￿nding hazards in this ￿gure can be attributed entirely
to severance pay (and not EB). The ￿gure shows that severance pay lowers job ￿nding hazards
throughout the spell. The gap between the hazard rates in the two groups expands after week 5 of
the spell, and gradually narrows starting around week 25. This pattern is consistent with a model
where agents become increasingly sensitive to cash-on-hand as the spell elapses, but eventually
deplete the initial cash grant.
We interpret Figures 5-8 as showing that a shock to cash-on-hand has substantial e⁄ects on
labor market behavior, rejecting the full insurance model (PIH with complete markets).
Extended Bene￿ts. We now replicate the preceding analysis for the extended bene￿t policy.
Figure 9a plots the relationship between average nonemployment durations and months worked
(MW) in the past ￿ve years in the full sample. As in Figure 5a, this ￿gure ignores censoring
and excludes observations with a nonemployment duration of more than 2 years. Figure 9a shows
25that there is a clearly discernible jump in the average duration of joblessness of approximately 7
days around the EB discontinuity. Figure 9b replicates Figure 9a in the restricted sample, where
the entire discontinuity at MW = 36 can be attributed to EB. This ￿gure con￿rms that the
discontinuity in EB eligibility is in fact responsible for the most of the jump in nonemployment
durations in Figure 9a.
In Figure 9c, we examine how the average hazard rates over the ￿rst twenty weeks of the spell
vary around the EB discontinuity. We estimate a proportional hazard model analogous to that in
(14) on the full sample, with dummies for months of work in the previous 5 years instead of job
tenure. To eliminate the problem of a double discontinuity, we include a cubic polynomial in job
tenure and a dummy for severance pay eligibility (plus their interactions). Consistent with the
results in Figures 9a-b, this ￿gure shows that there is a discontinuous drop of approximately 7% in
the average hazard rate at the EB discontinuity.
In Figure 8b, we examine how extending UI bene￿ts a⁄ects search behavior as the spell elapses,
comparing the weekly job ￿nding hazards for individuals in the three months to the left and right of
the MW = 36 discontinuity in the restricted sample. This ￿gure shows that the bene￿t extension
has a large e⁄ect on behavior after week 20, when the additional income is received. However,
people eligible for extended bene￿ts also have substantially lower job ￿nding hazards than those
ineligible for EB prior to week 20, i.e. before they actually receive any additional income. This
result provides clear evidence that at least some individuals are forward-looking, and take into
account their future expected income stream when choosing search behavior in the early weeks of
the spell.26 This ￿nding rejects a model of completely myopic behavior.
VI.B Hazard Model Estimates
To quantify the e⁄ects of severance pay and extended bene￿ts on the duration of job search more
precisely, we estimate a series of proportional hazards models for the risk of ￿nding a new job. These
models include unrestricted daily baseline hazards, a set of covariates (X), indicators for eligibility
for severance pay and extended bene￿ts (S and E, respectively), and third-order polynomials in
job tenure (JT) and months of work in the previous 5 years (MW) that allow the derivative of the
control function to change discontinuously at the eligibility cuto⁄s:
26This behavioral response is consistent with but conceptually distinct from the well-known ￿nding of Katz and
Meyer (1990). Katz and Meyer show that unemployment exit hazards rise in the weeks immediately before the date
of bene￿t exhaustion. We show that the bene￿t exhaustion date a⁄ects search behavior early in the spell as well by
comparing job ￿nding hazards under two di⁄erent potential duration policies.
26hd = ￿d expf￿spS + ￿ebE + ￿X (15)
+ ￿1JT + ￿2JT + ￿3JT3
+ ￿S
1S ￿ (JT ￿ 36) + ￿S
2S ￿ (JT ￿ 36)2 + ￿S
3S ￿ (JT ￿ 36)3
+ ￿1MW + ￿2MW2 + ￿3MW3
+ ￿E
1 E ￿ (MW ￿ 36) + ￿E
2 E ￿ (MW ￿ 36)2 + ￿E
3 E ￿ (MW ￿ 36)3g:
In all cases, we censor the spells at 140 days in order to isolate the e⁄ects of the policy variables
in the ￿rst 20 weeks of job search, prior to the point at which extended bene￿ts become available.
Thus, the estimated e⁄ect of extended bene￿ts can be interpreted as the e⁄ect of future bene￿ts
on current search activity.
Table 2 presents estimates of ￿sp and ￿eb from a set of alternative samples and speci￿cations.
In column 1, we estimate the e⁄ect of severance pay on the job ￿nding hazard in the restricted
sample. Since the severance and EB discontinuities do not overlap in the restricted sample, this
speci￿cation includes the cubic control function for JT only (i.e., the ￿eb and ￿j coe¢ cients in
(15) are restricted to equal 0). Receipt of severance pay is estimated to reduce the job-￿nding
hazard by 12.7% on average in the ￿rst twenty weeks of the spell. In column 2, we implement
an analogous speci￿cation to estimate the e⁄ect of extended bene￿ts, including the cubic control
function for MW instead of JT along with the E indicator variable instead of S. Eligibility for
extended bene￿ts is estimated to reduce the job-￿nding hazard by 8.4%.
In column 3, we estimate the severance pay and EB e⁄ects jointly in the full sample using
the ￿double RD￿ control function in (15). These estimates corroborate that the results in the
full sample are similar to those in the restricted sample, namely that eligibility for severance pay
reduces job ￿nding hazards somewhat more than eligibility for EB. Both coe¢ cient estimates are
highly statistically signi￿cant, with a t-statistic of 7.4 for severance pay and 5.8 for EB.
Column 4 reports estimates of the double RD model controlling for the following observables:
the worker￿ s gender, marital status, Austrian nationality, ￿blue collar￿occupation indicator, age
and its square, log of the previous wage and its square, as well as dummies for the month and year of
the job termination. The EB point estimate falls slightly to -6.4% when these controls are included,
while the severance pay e⁄ect remains roughly constant at -11.5%. Both estimates remain highly
statistically signi￿cant, indicating the results are robust to these changes in the covariate set.
27Robustness Checks. In Table 3, we investigate the robustness of these baseline results by
extending the ￿nal speci￿cation from Table 2 (the double RD speci￿cation with controls) in various
ways. In the model in column 1 of Table 3a, we add an indicator for months at the end of the
tenure year (i.e., months 21-23, 33-35,...) to adjust for seasonal patterns associated with integer
years of tenure. In speci￿cation 2, we take an alternative approach to dealing with the tenure
seasonality problem by excluding all observations in the last three months of each tenure year.
Both of these approaches to adjusting for seasonality yield similar results, con￿rming that the
estimated severance pay and EB e⁄ects are not spuriously generated by seasonal patterns.
In speci￿cation 3, we expand the set of covariates to include the ￿saturated￿control set used
to estimate the predicted hazards in Figure 4c. Many of these covariates ￿such as the duration of
the previous job and the duration of the previous spell of nonemployment ￿are correlated with the
unobserved skills and tastes of job seekers, and could not be included in a conventional causal model
for the e⁄ects of severance pay and extended bene￿ts. In a regression discontinuity design, however,
adding such ￿endogenous￿control variables does not a⁄ect the consistency of the RD estimates. As
would be expected given the results in Figure 4c, inclusion of this rich set of endogenous covariates
has little e⁄ect on the estimated discontinuities, helping to mitigate any concern that our results
are driven by selection around the discontinuity.
In column 4 of Table 3a we examine the robustness of our results to way in which search duration
is measured. Speci￿cally, we measure duration as the time registered as unemployed rather than
the time to the next job. We code observations where the end of registered unemployment does
not coincide with the start of a new job as censored, and replicate the baseline model (speci￿cation
4 of Table 2) with this alternative duration measure. The estimates show that our results are
robust to the way in which durations are measured.
In the next group of speci￿cations, we assess the importance of selection around the severance
pay discontinuity by restricting the analysis to subgroups for which selective ￿ring is less likely to
occur. In each case, we replicate the baseline speci￿cation 4 of Table 2. In the model reported
in column 1 of Table 3b, we restrict the sample to individuals laid o⁄ by small ￿rms ￿those with
less than 100 employees. Since workers in smaller ￿rms typically perform more specialized job
functions and have fewer close substitutes, we conjecture that these ￿rms will ￿nd it harder to lay
o⁄ one worker instead of another simply to save a severance payment. Hence, there should be
less scope for selective ￿ring in small ￿rms. Consistent with this intuition, we ￿nd no evidence of
a discontinuity in wages in this subsample of small ￿rms (unlike the situation for the full sample
28shown in Figure 4b). The estimates in column 1 of Table 3b show that severance pay and EB
e⁄ects remain similar in the small ￿rm subsample, suggesting that our main results are not driven
by selection e⁄ects.
In the models in columns 2-4 of Table 3b, we take a di⁄erent approach to identifying subsamples
with less selection. An ideal method of constructing a sample purged of selection around the
discontinuity would be to focus on ￿rm or plant closures, where ￿rms cannot selectively choose
which workers to ￿re. Unfortunately, most ￿rms in Austria are so small that even though we have
the full universe of layo⁄s over two decades, the sample of individuals laid o⁄in mass events around
the discontinuities of interest is small. Given this constraint, we implement a second-best strategy
of focusing on cases where multiple individuals were laid o⁄together from the same company in the
same month. Such layo⁄s are more likely to be caused by an ￿exogenous￿shock such as ￿nancial
distress, and thus less likely to involve selective ￿ring. In column 2 we estimate the baseline model
(speci￿cation 4 of Table 2) on the subsample of workers who were laid o⁄ along with one or more
workers from their ￿rm in the same month. In column 3 we restrict the sample to layo⁄s involving
four or more individuals, while in column 4 we restrict the sample to layo⁄s involving 5 or more
individuals. The point estimates of the severance pay and EB coe¢ cients remain quite stable as we
restrict the sample to larger layo⁄ events, though the standard errors rise substantially, re￿ ecting
the loss of sample size as we focus on bigger layo⁄ events.27 We view these results as providing
further support for the causal interpretation of our estimates.
Placebo Tests. The last three columns of Table 3b report estimates of the ￿placebo test￿
corresponding to Figure 7 by examining how tenure at the previous job and months worked prior
to the relevant period for EB eligibility a⁄ect job ￿nding hazards. To implement these placebo
tests, we focus on the subsample of individuals who have two or more unemployment spells in the
data. Let ￿job 1￿denote the job prior to the one most recently lost, and ￿job 2￿denote the job
most recently lost. We obtain a sample consistent with the one we use for our main analysis by
restricting attention to individuals who (a) had job tenure of between 1 and 5 years at both jobs
and (b) worked for between 1 and 5 years of the ￿ve years preceding each of the job losses. We
then estimate the e⁄ect of the severance pay and EB ￿placebos￿￿indicators for having more than
36 months of job tenure on job 1, and more than 36 months of work in the 5 years before the end of
job 1, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 report estimates for models analogous to the speci￿cations in
27The sample of layo⁄s involving 5 or more individuals from the same company includes only 35, 579 observations
(5.5% of our full sample), showing why closures or ￿mass layo⁄s￿alone constitute too small a sample for the analysis.
29columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 (i.e., with and without controls) using the placebo variables and control
functions based on job 1. Note that the placebo variables do not predict receipt of severance pay
or EB in the current spell conditional on the control functions because eligibility for these policies is
a smooth function of the job tenure and months worked variables for job 1. Both sets of estimates
con￿rm that there is no placebo e⁄ect, consistent with Figure 7.
Finally, the model in column 7 of Table 3b includes the true severance pay and EB eligibility
indicators along with the placebo indicators and cubic polynomials for all four running variables.
The true severance pay and EB variables are still estimated to reduce job ￿nding hazards substan-
tially (though the standard errors rise because the sample is one-￿fth the original size), while the
placebo e⁄ects are statistically indistinguishable from zero. The hypothesis that the placebo and
true severance pay e⁄ects are equal is rejected with p < 0:01.
We have ￿t a wide variety of other speci￿cations to further probe the robustness of the results
in Tables 2, 3a, and 3b. The estimated severance pay and EB e⁄ects are always on the order of -6
to -12 percent, with a ratio of ￿sp=￿eb between 1.2 and 1.8 in most cases. For example, replacing
the third-order polynomials with fourth-order polynomials leads to estimated severance pay and
EB e⁄ects that are a little bigger in magnitude than those reported in Table 2. Trimming very
high or very low wage workers, dropping those recalled to the job prior to the one just lost, and
estimating the e⁄ects of the two policies on average hazards over a shorter period (e.g. the ￿rst 10
weeks) or a longer period (e.g. the ￿rst six months or year of the spell) also yield similar results.
Heterogeneity Analysis. Starting with Zeldes (1989), several studies have tested whether liquid-
ity constraints a⁄ect consumption by comparing the e⁄ects of cash-on-hand in liquidity constrained
vs. unconstrained groups. One could in principle implement similar tests using data from the labor
market. Unfortunately, we cannot cut our sample by measures of liquidity because the Austrian
Social Security database does not have information on the assets or family circumstances of job
losers. Cutting the data on variables that are likely to be correlated with liquidity ￿such as age
or wage ￿is also problematic because our treatment e⁄ects are likely to vary across these groups
for other reasons. For example, higher wage or older workers may have more assets on average,
but also receive larger severance pay amounts on average and are less likely to receive unemploy-
ment assistance. Thus, we cannot make sharp predictions about heterogeneity across demographic
groups. In practice, we ￿nd no systematic di⁄erences in the estimated e⁄ects of severance pay and
EB across demographic groups (gender, age, wage, blue collar status, education, and region).28
28Another potentially interesting comparison, given the unusual length of our sample period, is between job losers
30While we cannot obtain clear evidence on heterogeneity in the Austrian data, such evidence is
available in U.S. data. Chetty (2006b) studies the heterogeneity in the e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts on
unemployment durations. He ￿nds that the e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts on durations is largest among
groups that are likely to have limited ability to smooth consumption ￿e.g. those with low assets
prior to job loss or a single earner in the household. This ￿nding is consistent with models such
as bu⁄er-stock behavior, which also match the results we obtain here.
VII Search Outcomes
Having found that severance pay and extended bene￿ts increase the duration of job search, it is
interesting to ask whether there are any di⁄erences in the nature of the jobs obtained through a
longer search process. In addition to providing further evidence on search models, this analysis is
useful in assessing whether improvements in future job outcomes provide a rationale for temporary
income support programs. As above, we begin with a graphical overview of the main ￿ndings and
then present regression estimates.
VII.A Graphical Results





i is individual i0s wage in the ￿rst year at the next job and w
p
i is his wage in the
￿nal year at the previous job. Note that gi is missing for 15% of the sample, most of which is
accounted for by individuals who do not ￿nd a new job before the end of the sampling period.
Figure 10a plots the average value of gi in each tenure-month cell. The smoothness of wage growth
rates through the 36 month discontinuity indicates that the increased duration of search induced
by severance payments does not yield any improvements in ex-post wages.
Even if there are no bene￿ts in terms of wages, individuals could potentially ￿nd jobs with
higher quality in other dimensions. One convenient summary statistic for the match quality of
subsequent jobs is their duration: better matches should presumably last longer (see e.g., Jovanovic
1979). We examine the e⁄ect of severance pay on the duration of the next job in Figure 10b. This
￿gure plots the average monthly hazard of leaving the next job (over the ￿rst 5 years on that job) by
tenure at the job that just ended. We construct this ￿gure by ￿tting a Cox model for the duration
in the 1980s and 1990s. Despite some changes in the macroeconomic environment and in various policies (e.g., the
growing availability of training programs for job seekers), the estimated e⁄ects of the severance pay and EB programs
are similar in the two decades.
31of the next job, with dummies for the tenure-month categories (omitting month 35), as in Figure
6a. We then plot the coe¢ cients on the tenure-month categories, which can be interpreted as the
percentage di⁄erence in the average job-leaving hazard in a given tenure-month group relative to
tenure-month 35. The job-leaving hazards are smooth through the discontinuity, indicating that
severance pay eligibility has no e⁄ect on the duration of the subsequent job.
We replicate the same analysis for extended bene￿ts in Figure 11 by changing the running
variable on the x-axis to months worked in the past ￿ve years. Again, we ￿nd that both wages
and subsequent job-leaving hazards are smooth through the EB discontinuity. Hence, extending
unemployment durations by increasing the maximum potential duration of UI bene￿ts does not
appear to yield any match quality gains as measured by wages or subsequent job duration. We
have also constructed similar graphs for other measures of job match quality, which we discuss
below in the context of regression estimates.
VII.B Regression Estimates
To formally identify the match quality impacts of severance pay and extended bene￿ts, we estimate
double RD speci￿cations analogous to (15), changing the dependent variable to a measure of job
quality. The results of this analysis are reported in Tables 4a and 4b.
Speci￿cation 1 of Table 4a examines the e⁄ect of severance pay and EB on wage growth (gi)
using an OLS regression without any controls. Speci￿cation 2 adds the ￿saturated￿control set used
in speci￿cation 3 of Table 3a to this regression. Speci￿cation 3 reports coe¢ cient estimates from a
hazard model for the duration of the new job without controls, censoring next job durations at ￿ve
years to examine how the policies a⁄ect average job-leaving hazards in the ￿rst ￿ve years. Finally,
speci￿cation 4 replicates speci￿cation 3 with the saturated control set. The regression estimates
in Table 4a are consistent with the ￿gures: there is no evidence of match quality gains in any of
the speci￿cations. For example, in the speci￿cations with controls, severance pay is estimated to
change wage growth by a statistically insigni￿cant -0.2% and change the hazard rate of leaving the
next job by 0.0%.
An important distinction between the present analysis and some earlier studies that have failed
to detect evidence of quality gains is the relative precision of our estimates. The standard errors
in speci￿cations 1 and 2 of Table 4a show that even a 1% improvement in wages caused by either
severance pay or EB would be detectable in our analysis. Hence, our evidence suggests that the
job quality gains from extending unemployment durations are not merely statistically insigni￿cant,
32but quite small in magnitude.29
In Table 4b, we consider some additional measures of match quality. All of the speci￿cations
in this table are OLS regressions using the double RD speci￿cation with the saturated control set.
The model in column 1 considers the possibility that severance pay or EB￿ s have an e⁄ect on job
quality that is only realized with a lag. The dependent variable in this model is the growth in
wages from the previous job to the second calendar year of the next job (including only individuals
who stayed at their next job for more than one year). The model in column 2 considers the
change in the size of the ￿rm at which the individual is employed (measured as the change in
log number of employees). The idea underlying this speci￿cation is that larger ￿rms may o⁄er
better jobs to workers on certain dimensions such as stability (Oi and Idson 1999); thus, one way
a worker can obtain a better match through more search is by ￿nding a job at a larger ￿rm.
Finally, the models in columns 3 and 4 examine the e⁄ects of severance pay and extended bene￿ts
on two measures of sectoral mobility: the probability of switching industries (column 3) and the
probability of taking a job in a di⁄erent geographical area (column 4). We code industries into six
categories (agriculture/mining, manufacturing, sales, hotel, transport, and service). The mean rate
of industry switching in the sample is 57%. We de￿ne geographical areas using the 108 districts
in Austria. The mean probability of switching to a ￿rm in a di⁄erent district is 47%.
There is no evidence of economically signi￿cant gains in any of the four additional measures
of job match quality in Table 4b. We also checked for match quality e⁄ects using analogous
regression models and graphical methods for several other measures (not reported): the probability
of switching from a ￿blue collar￿to a ￿white collar￿occupation, the mean growth in wages and
total earned wage income (at any employer) in each of the ￿ve years following the unemployment
spell, and the total number of days employed (at any ￿rm) in each of the ￿ve years following the
unemployment spell. In addition, we examined percentiles of the wage distribution to check if there
are gains in the tails of the distribution. None of these outcomes shows evidence of discontinuities
at the eligibility thresholds for extended bene￿ts or severance pay. We also split the data into
subgroups (e.g. by age, gender, wage, education) and found no evidence of match e⁄ects in any of
the subgroups.
In view of these results, we conclude that the extension of search duration through increases in
cash-on-hand or provision of extended UI bene￿ts has little or no e⁄ect on subsequent job quality
29Shimer and Werning (2005) simulate a reservation wage model with a standard deviation of wage opportunities
of approximately 1%. We cannot detect the match quality e⁄ects generated by such a model.
33in the short and intermediate run (up to 5 years). There are several potential explanations for the
absence of match quality e⁄ects. One possibility is that there is limited variation in the quality
of jobs available to a given worker because of the high rate of union coverage in Austria. As
noted in section IV, however, the variation in wage changes experienced by job losers is fairly large
(￿(￿logw) = 0:51), suggesting that there is signi￿cant ex-ante uncertainty about job qualities.
A second explanation is that because employed workers can continue to search, people do not
raise their reservation job qualities signi￿cantly in response to the availability of severance pay or
extended bene￿ts. Indeed, if search is equally productive on and o⁄ the job, the reservation wage
only depends on current UI bene￿ts (Lise 2006), and we would expect no e⁄ect of severance or EB
on the quality of the next job. A third explanation is that the arrival rate of job o⁄ers is relatively
low, so the option value of waiting for a better o⁄er is small and most workers take the ￿rst o⁄er
they receive. Unfortunately, given the available evidence, we cannot distinguish between these
alternative explanations.
VIII Calibration Results for Competing Models of Behavior
In this section, we use the theoretical framework developed in Section III to interpret the impli-
cations of our empirical ￿ndings for models of intertemporal behavior. In relating our empirical
estimates to the search model, we de￿ne each ￿period￿as an interval of 10 weeks. Under this
timing convention, the bene￿t extension from 20 to 30 weeks raises the value of UI bene￿ts 2 pe-
riods after the period of job loss. Ignoring discounting over only 20 weeks, the key equation (9)
predicting the relative e⁄ects of severance pay and increased future UI bene￿ts on search intensity






















We ￿rst calculate the empirical value of m2 de￿ned in equation (9) using the hazard model
estimates. We then illustrate how this sample moment can be used to test and calibrate models
34by simulating m2 for two benchmark cases: a simple PIH model and a credit-constrained case.
Empirical Estimate of Sample Moment. The hazard model estimates give the e⁄ects of eligi-
bility for 2 months of severance pay or 10 weeks of additional UI bene￿ts on the re-employment
hazard rate. To calculate the value of m2 implied by these estimates, we ￿rst re-scale the co-
e¢ cients into the e⁄ects of a $1 increase in cash-on-hand and a $1 increase in b2. Since we
use a proportional hazards speci￿cation, and s￿
0 represents the probability of ￿nding a job in the
￿rst 10 weeks of search, the estimated e⁄ect of eligibility for severance pay on the hazard rate
is ￿sp ￿ @ logs￿
0=@A0 ￿ vsp, where vsp denotes the total cash value of the severance payment.30
Likewise, ￿eb ￿ @ logs￿























In the appendix, we show that vsp ￿ 2:69w, where w is the net (after-tax) monthly wage, because
of the favorable tax treatment of severance pay. We also show that veb ￿ 0:85w , because of the
availability of UA after exhaustion of regular UI bene￿ts. Therefore, we estimate that veb=vsp ￿
0:32 on average.
Next, we calculate p￿
2, the probability that extended bene￿ts are actually received. 50% of the
job losers in our sample remain out of work after 20 weeks. However, 15% of job losers are still
not observed with a job even 2 years later. Since our dataset covers roughly 85% of employment
in Austria, we believe that most of this group represents people who have found a job outside the
sectors covered in the data (self-employment or as a civil servant). Assuming that the individuals
who are not observed in a job within two years have the same job ￿nding rates on average as other
job seekers, but are simply not observed returning to work, the actual probability of remaining out
of work for 20 weeks or more is 41%. We therefore set p￿
2 = 0:41.
Combining all these elements, it follows that m2 = 0:13￿sp=￿eb. Using the estimates of ￿sp
and ￿eb reported in column 3 of Table 2 (the baseline no-controls speci￿cation), we obtain a
point estimate of m2 = 0:174 with a standard error (constructed by the delta method) of 0:041.
Using the estimates from column 3 of Table 3a (which includes our richest set of controls) yields
m2 = 0:19 with a standard error of 0:071. These estimates of m2 are broadly representative of the
11 alternatives reported in Tables 2 and 3, which have a mean ratio of m2 = 0:19.
30Our models actually measure the e⁄ect of severance pay and EB￿ s on hazard rates on the ￿rst 20 weeks of
joblessness. Models based on only the ￿rst 10 weeks, however, give very similar results. To maximize precision we
use the estimates that average over the longer period.
35Predicted Moment for Credit-Constraint Model. Consider a model where individuals are forward
looking but cannot borrow and set consumption equal to income in each period. We now calculate
the value of m2 predicted by this ￿fully credit constrained￿model.
Let ￿t = bt
w denote the bene￿t-replacement rate in period t of the unemployment spell. Let F
represent other family income, which we shall assume is exogenously ￿xed, and let ￿ = w=(w +F)
denote the share of the job-seeker￿ s earnings in total family income. As discussed in the appendix,
we estimate from available survey data that a typical Austrian wage earner in our age range
contributes about 1/2 of his or her family income (￿ = 0:50):
In the credit-constrained case, ce
0 = w + F, and cu
0 = ￿0w + F. Assuming that u(c) is in the
constant relative risk aversion class,
D =
u0(￿0w + F) ￿ u0(w + F)
u0(￿0w + F)
=
u0((￿￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ u0(1)
u0((￿￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿))
Setting ￿0 = 0:55, the implied value of D represents the percentage change in the marginal utility
of consumption associated with a 22.5% reduction in consumption. For example, if the coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion (￿) is 2, D = 0:4.
To complete the calibration of m2, note that cu
2 = ￿2w+F, where ￿2 represents the replacement









assuming that u is in the CRRA class with elasticity ￿. For example, with ￿ = 2, Z2 = 0:61.
Using (16), it follows that m2 = 0:4￿0:61 = 0:24 if ￿ = 2. Predicted values of m2 for other values
of ￿ are presented in the Panel A of Table 5.
Predicted Moment for PIH Model. Now consider a model where individuals have unrestricted
access to credit at a ￿xed interest rate ￿the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) benchmark. The
calculation of m2 in this case is more complicated, and in general requires an iterative solution
procedure with a complete speci￿cation of   and other parameters of the model. We instead
derive an upper bound for m2 under three simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the
36rate of time discount equals the interest rate. This implies that once employed, people choose a
constant consumption pro￿le. Second, we assume that people have a relatively long work life, so
that the annuity income from an asset amount A is approximately r=(1 + r)A.31 Together with
our assumption that jobs persist inde￿nitely, these assumptions imply ce
t = w + F + r=(1 + r)At.
Our third assumption is that individuals can ￿nd a job with certainty within T periods. As
noted above, 85% of the job losers in our sample are observed in a new job within 2 years, and the
remaining 15% are likely to have taken jobs outside the sectors covered by our data. Therefore,
we set T = 100 weeks (i.e., 10 periods of 10 weeks).32
To derive an upper bound for m2, observe that consumption falls over the spell in the PIH
model: cu
2 6 cu
0. Thus m2 6 D. We derive an upper bound on D in a series of steps. The
￿rst step is to calculate a lower bound on the optimal path of ce
t. Since consumption is always
lower when unemployed than employed (cu
t ￿ ce
t), the rate of decline in assets over a spell of
unemployment can be bounded.33 This restriction on the rate of decline in assets yields a lower








0 = w + F + r=(1 + r)A0. Next, we use this bound on ce
t to derive an upper bound on
u0(cu
0), the marginal utility of consumption in the ￿rst period of the unemployment spell. Consider








1 is the optimal level of search intensity in period 1.34 If the job seeker can always ￿nd a







31This is a reasonable approximation for our case, since we focus on people under age 50, and the Austrian pension
system is quite generous (replacing about 75% of wages).
32Increasing T to 3 or 4 years has little e⁄ect on our calibration results, provided that we continue to assume that
those who are not observed on a job at that point are actually censored, rather than still looking for work.
33Speci￿cally, if a person is still unemployed in period t ￿ 1, At = (1 + r)(At￿1 + F + bt￿1 ￿ c
u
t￿1). Using




t￿1 and the equation for c
e
t￿1, this implies that At > At￿1 ￿ (1 + r)(w ￿ bt￿1), and thus
At > A0 ￿ (1 + r)
Pt￿1
k=0(w ￿ bk):


























t represents the probability of obtaining a job in period t,
conditional on unsuccessful search in period 0. We use the empirical distribution of waiting times
to a new job in our sample to estimate q￿
t.35 Finally, plugging in the lower bound on ce
t and the
empirical values of q￿
t into equation (18), we obtain an upper bound on u0(cu
0). This translates
directly into a bound on D since ce
0 is ￿xed.
Obtaining a numerical value for D through this procedure requires speci￿cation of several
parameters related to the income path and preferences. We assume that ￿t = 0:55 for the ￿rst
30 weeks (3 periods) of joblessness, and that ￿t = 0:21 thereafter, re￿ ecting the safety net of
unemployment assistance. We also assume that a typical job loser contributes ￿ = 50% of his or
her family income, and that assets at the time of job loss A0 = 0.
The free parameters in calibrating the PIH model are the interest rate (r) and coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion (￿). We present the predicted upper bounds on D = m2 for various
combinations of these two parameters in Panel B of Table 5. Note that alternative parameter
combinations can lead to approximately the same prediction for m2. For example, a model with
￿ = 1;r = 10% yields a bound of D = m2 = 0:013, the same value implied by a model with
￿ = 2;r = 5%.
Comparing the Empirical Estimate to the Benchmarks. How does the empirical value of the
sample moment compare with the values predicted by the two benchmark models? Panel C of
Table 5 shows the empirical values of m2 implied by the no-controls and saturated-controls hazard
model estimates for comparison to the values predicted by the two models.
The data appear to be clearly inconsistent with the PIH model, using values for the interest
rate and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion in a conventional range. For example, the lower
bound of the 95% con￿dence interval for the estimate of m2 based on the baseline hazard model
without controls is 0:115. Comparing this lower bound to the predictions in Panel B of Table 5, one
could reject any parameter combination with r < 30% or ￿ < 3. Hence, unlike consumption-based
studies which also ￿nd evidence of ￿excess sensitivity￿(e.g. Gruber 1997), the estimates here are
su¢ ciently precise to rule out the benchmark PIH even with fairly extreme assumptions about risk
aversion and the interest rate.
The estimates of m2 are closer to the fully credit-constrained model, which predicts m2 = 0:24
if ￿ = 2. This prediction is above our point estimates of m2, but lies within the 95% con￿dence
35In calculating q
￿
t, we ignore those who are not observed in a new job within T = 10 periods (100 weeks), again
assuming that this group ￿nds jobs in sectors not covered by our dataset at the same rate as the rest of the sample.
38interval of the estimates.
Summary and Interpretation. Figure 1 summarizes our calibration results by showing where the
representative agent in the data lies on the continuum of dynamic models ordered by sensitivity
to cash-on-hand. The predicted values of m2 for the PIH and credit-constraint models in this
￿gure assume r = 5% and ￿ = 2, which are typical parameter choices for the interest rate and
risk aversion in the literature (see e.g., Carroll 2004, Chetty 2006b). Our empirical estimate of
m2 ’ 0:17 is about 70% of the way between the values predicted by the PIH and credit-constraint
models. A model with heterogeneous agents, some of whom behave as the PIH predicts and some
of whom set consumption equal to income (as in Campbell and Mankiw 1989), could therefore ￿t
the data.
We considered the two benchmark models above primarily for illustrative purposes. One
could conduct similar calibration exercises for many other models of household behavior. With
an appropriate choice of preferences and ￿nancial technologies, several models could potentially
generate a value of m2 consistent with the data. One well-known model that is likely to be
consistent with our estimates is Deaton￿ s (1991) bu⁄er-stock model, which assumes forward-looking
behavior but minimum asset limits that eventually constrain borrowing. In such a model, the
optimal level of consumption while unemployed can be substantially lower than in the PIH, leading
to a larger predicted value for m2 than a simple PIH model. A similar pro￿le of consumption
is predicted by the bu⁄er-stock model proposed by Carroll (1997, 2004), which does not have an
exogenous asset limit. However, a key assumption of the Carroll model ￿that income can fall to
0 ￿is less attractive for Austria, where permanent unemployment assistance constitutes a lower
bound on income.36
IX Conclusion
The general objective of this paper has been to bring methods and data from the labor economics
literature to bear on an issue of longstanding interest in macroeconomics and public ￿nance. Specif-
ically, we used data on job search behavior coupled with discontinuities in the eligibility rules for
severance pay and UI bene￿ts in Austria to distinguish between models of intertemporal behavior.
We reached three main empirical ￿ndings: (1) A cash grant equivalent to two months of wages
induces substantial changes in search behavior well beyond what is predicted by a benchmark lifecy-
36See Michaelides (2003) for a more detailed discussion of how the availability of social insurance can be used to
distinguish between the Deaton and Carroll models.
39cle model with unrestricted borrowing; (2) extending UI bene￿ts also a⁄ects search behavior early
in the spell, providing evidence that households are forward-looking; and (3) lengthening durations
through EB and severance pay policies has little or no e⁄ect on subsequent job match quality.
Interpreting our reduced-form empirical results through the framework of a job search model, we
conclude that the behavior of job searchers is best described by a model such as bu⁄er-stock be-
havior, where agents have limited capacity to smooth income ￿ uctuations. We also construct a
sample moment based on the ratio of the severance pay and EB e⁄ects that can be used to calibrate
intertemporal models to our empirical ￿ndings.
This characterization of household behavior has several normative implications. At a broad
level, it implies that temporary changes in income have more important economic consequences than
traditional models suggest. For example, temporary ￿scal policy changes such as tax cuts could
have signi￿cant e⁄ects on the economy. The evidence of imperfect smoothing suggests that there
may be a signi￿cant role for temporary income support programs such as unemployment insurance,
temporary welfare, and workers compensation. In addition, the ￿nding that cash grants change
search behavior in a manner similar to UI bene￿t extensions implies that much of the behavioral
response to temporary bene￿t social insurance programs is an ￿income￿or liquidity e⁄ect rather
than moral hazard caused by distortion in incentives. Analyzing these issues formally in dynamic
models calibrated to match the evidence documented here is an interesting direction for further
research.
More generally, the basic idea of using data on labor supply instead of consumption to distin-
guish between models can be applied in other settings. For example, examining whether work
hours or retirement choices exhibit ￿excess sensitivity￿to cash-on-hand may yield further insights
into models of household behavior.
40Appendix
A. Sample De￿nition.
The Austrian Social Security Database contains employment records for private sector employ-
ees, public sector workers who are not classi￿ed as permanent civil servants, and the unemployed.
The groups for whom information is missing are self employed and civil servants. Based on Aus-
trian national statistics, about 10% of the labor force were self employed and 7% were civil servants
in 1996. Therefore, we estimate that the Social Security Database covers roughly 85% of the total
workforce.
For each covered job, the database reports the starting and ending date of the job, the identity
of the employer, certain characteristics of the job (e.g., industry, occupation), and total earnings.
No information is available on hours of work. Earnings are censored at the Social Security con-
tribution limit, but this only a⁄ects a small fraction (2%) of the observations in our sample. The
database also includes starting and ending dates for unemployment insurance (UI) claims, and
information on whether an individual is registered with the employment o¢ ce as looking for work.
No information is available on the amount of UI payments actually received. We code an individual
as ￿unemployed￿if he or she is receiving UI, or registered as looking for work.
From the database, we extract all job terminations between 1981 and 2001 that were followed
by a UI claim and did not result in a retirement claim within the same calendar year (1,817,221
terminations). We exclude terminations from jobs in schools, hospitals, and other public sector
service industries (4% of the total) because some of these jobs are ￿xed term. We also exclude
jobs in the construction sector (17% of the remaining sample) because of the di⁄erent severance
pay regulations. We then eliminate terminations from jobs that lasted for 5 or more years, and for
individuals who worked all weeks in the past 5 years. These two restrictions reduce the remaining
sample by a further 33%. We eliminate terminations involving people whose age in years is under
20 or over 49 at the time of the job loss (a further 10% of the remaining sample), and individuals
who return to the same employer (a further 19% of the remaining sample). Finally, we drop all
terminations with a delay of over 28 days between the job termination date and the start of the
UI claim. This restriction eliminates job quitters (who face a 4 week waiting period for UI) and
eliminates another 10% of the remaining sample. The ￿nal sample includes 650,922 job losses.
Note that individuals can appear in our sample of job losses multiple times. Among individuals
included in the sample at least once, we observe a single job loss for 84%, two job losses for 13%,
and 3 or more job losses for the remaining 3% of individuals.
For the job losses in our sample, we use all available information on employment, unemploy-
ment, and earnings in the Social Security database ￿les for the years 1972 to 2003. We merge in
information on completed education and marital status from the Austrian unemployment registers,
which are available from 1987 to 1998. Spell-speci￿c demographic information is available in this
￿le for each unemployment spell, and we use the information in the last recorded unemployment
spell for each individual to assign education and marital status. For individuals whose only spell
of unemployment occurred before 1987 or after 1998, however, these variables are missing. We can
assign information for 66% of job losses occurring before 1987, and 75% of job losses after 1998.
B. Cash Value of Severance Pay and Extended Bene￿ts.
Severance pay is equal to 2 months of gross wages, but is taxed at roughly 6%. The average
tax rate on earnings in Austria is approximately 30 percent. Letting w represent the net monthly
wage, the value of severance pay is therefore 2w(1 ￿ :06)=(1 ￿ 0:3) = 2:69w.
41Extended bene￿ts provide 10 extra weeks (2.5 extra months) of eligibility for UI. In the absence
of UI, however, people are eligible for unemployment assistance (UA). Thus the value of extended
bene￿ts is approximately 2:5w￿(1￿UA=UI), where ￿ is the replacement rate of regular UI bene￿ts
and UA=UI represents the ratio of UA bene￿ts to UI bene￿ts. The statutory replacement rate for
UI bene￿ts is 55%. However, most workers receive supplementary UI bene￿ts for their dependents:
on average we estimate that this raises the replacement rate to 64%. O⁄setting this is the fact
that workers in Austria receive 14 ￿monthly￿salaries per year whereas UI bene￿ts are monthly.
Thus the average e⁄ective replacement rate is ￿ = 0:64 ￿ 12=14 = 0:55.
Bene￿ts for UA are based on the formula UA = 0:92UI ￿ F + C, where F represents other
family member￿ s earnings and C represents dependent allowances. Data from the 2004 Survey of
Income and Living Conditions show that the average wage earner in Austria between the ages of
20 and 49 contributed just under one-half of his/her family income. Based on this, we assume
that F is approximately equal to w for a typical worker in our sample. Dependent allowances were
423 Euros per month for a partner and 213 Euros per month for each dependent child in 2000.
Assuming that a typical job loser has a partner and 2 children and a net wage of 1200 Euros per
month, we therefore estimate that UA=UI = 0:38. Thus, we estimate that the value of extended
bene￿ts is 2:5w(0:55)(1 ￿ 0:38) = 0:85w.
42References
Acemoglu, Daron and Robert Shimer, ￿E¢ cient Unemployment Insurance,￿Journal of Political
Economy CXIII (1999), 893-928
Addison, John T. and McKinley L. Blackburn, ￿The E⁄ects of Unemployment Insurance on
Postunemployment Earnings,￿Labour Economics, VII (January 2000), 21-53.
Aguiar, Mark and Erik Hurst, ￿Consumption vs. Expenditure,￿Journal of Political Economy
CVII (2005), 919-48.
Altonji, Joseph G. and Aloysius Siow ￿Testing the Response of Consumption to Income Changes
with (noisy) Panel Data,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, CII (1987), 293-328.
Angrist, Joshua and Victor Lavy, ￿Using Maimonides￿Rule To Estimate The E⁄ect Of Class
Size On Scholastic Achievement,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIV(2) (1999), 533-575.
Baily, Martin N., ￿Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance,￿Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, X (1978), 379-402.
Baker Tilly International, ￿Doing Business in Austria.￿ Baker Tilly International (August
2005). Available at: http://www.bakertillyinternational.com/pdf/Doing_Business_in_Austria-
Oct05.pdf
Bird, Roger C. and Ronald G. Bodkin, ￿The National Service Life-Insurance Dividend of 1950
and Consumption: A Further Test of the ￿ Strict￿Permanent-Income Hypothesis,￿The Journal of
Political Economy, LXXIII (October 1965), 499-515.
Blinder, Alan S., ￿Temporary Income Taxes and Consumer Spending,￿ Journal of Political
Economy, University of Chicago Press, LXXXIX (February 1981), 26-53.
Blinder, Alan S. and Angus Deaton, ￿The Time Series Consumption Function Revisited,￿in
William C. Brainard and George L. Perry, eds., Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (Wash-
ington D.C., 1985), 465-521.
Bloemen, Hans and Elena Stancanelli, ￿Financial Wealth, Consumption Smoothing and Income
Shocks Arising from Job Loss,￿Economica, LXXII (2005), 431-452.
Bodkin, Ronald, ￿Windfall Income and Consumption,￿The American Economic Review, XLIX
(1959), 602-614.
Browning, Martin, and Dolores M. Collado, ￿The Response of Expenditures to Anticipated
Income Changes: Panel Data Estimates,￿American Economic Review XCI (2001), 681-692.
Browning, Martin and Thomas Crossley, ￿Unemployment Insurance Levels and Consumption
Changes,￿Journal of Public Economics, LXXX (1999), 1-23.
Browning, Martin and Thomas Crossley, ￿The Life-Cycle Model of Consumption and Saving,￿
Journal of Economic Perspectives, XV (Summer 2001), 3-22.
Browning, Martin and Annamaria Lusardi, ￿Household Saving: Micro Theories and Micro
Facts,￿Journal of Economic Literature, XXXIV (December 1996), 1797-1855.
Burtless, Gary S., ￿Unemployment insurance and labor supply: a review￿ , in W. Lee Hansen
and James F. Byers, eds., ￿Unemployment Insurance: The second half-century,￿ (University of
Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI 1990), 69-107.
Campbell, John Y. and N. Gregory Mankiw, ￿Consumption, Income and Interest Rates: Rein-
terpreting the Time Series Evidence,￿NBER Macroeconomics Annual (1989), 185-216.
Carroll, Christopher, ￿Bu⁄er-Stock Saving and the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis,￿
Quarterly Journal of Economics CXII (1997), 1-56.
Carroll, Christopher, ￿Theoretical Foundations of Bu⁄er Stock Saving,￿NBER Working Paper
No. 10867 (2004).
Centeno, MÆrio, ￿The Match Quality Gains from Unemployment Insurance.￿Journal of Human
Resources XXXIX(3) (2004), 839-863.
43CESifo, ￿Dismissal Protection in Europe.￿ CESifo DICE Report 2/2004. Munich: CESifo,
2004.
Chetty, Raj, ￿A General Formula for the Optimal Level of Social Insurance,￿Journal of Public
Economics XC (November 2006a), 1879-1901.
Chetty, Raj, ￿Why do Unemployment Bene￿ts Raise Unemployment Durations? Moral Hazard
vs. Liquidity,￿UC-Berkeley mimeo (2006b).
Chetty, Raj, ￿A New Method of Estimating Risk Aversion.￿ American Economic Review
(2006c).
Classen, K.P., ￿The e⁄ect of unemployment insurance on the duration of unemployment and
subsequent earnings,￿Industrial and Labour Relations Review 30 (1977), 438-50.
Cox, James C. and Ronald L. Oaxaca, ￿Unemployment insurance and job search,￿in L. Bassi
and D. Crawford, eds, ￿Research in labor economics,￿XI, JAI Press (1990), 223-240.
Danforth, J. P., ￿On the Role of Consumption and Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion in the
Theory of Job Search,￿ in S. A. Lippman, and J. J. McCall, eds, ￿Studies in the Economics of
Search,￿(North-Holland, New York 1979), 109-131.
Deaton, Angus S., ￿Savings and Liquidity Constraints,￿ Econometrica LIX (1991), 1221-1248.
Deaton, Angus, (1992) ￿Understanding Consumption,￿(Oxford University Press, Oxford 1992).
DiNardo, John and David Lee, ￿Economic Impacts of New Unionization on U.S. Private Sector
Employers: 1984-2001,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics CXIX(4) (2004), 1383-1442.
Ehrenberg, R. and Ronald Oaxaca, ￿Unemployment insurance, duration of unemployment, and
subsequent wage gain,￿American Economic Review LXVI(5) (1976), 754-766.
EIRO (European Industrial Relations Observatory). ￿Austria: Collective Agreement Extension
Mechanisms and Practices Examined,￿ Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions, EIRO Online (January 2001), Available at
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2001/12/feature/at0112250f.html
Flavin, Marjorie, ￿The adjustment of consumption to changing expectations about future in-
come,￿Journal of Political Economy LXXXIX(5) (1981), 974-1009.
Flemming, J., ￿Aspects of optimal unemployment insurance,￿Journal of Public Economics X
(1978), 403-425.
Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln, Nicola and Matthias Sch￿ndeln, ￿Precautionary Savings and Self-Selection:
Evidence from the German Reuni￿cation ￿ Experiment￿ ,￿ Quarterly Journal of Economics CXX
(2005), 1085-1120.
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, and Jonathan A. Parker, ￿Consumption over the Life Cycle,￿Econo-
metrica, LXX (2002), 47-89.
Gruber, Jonathan, ￿The Consumption Smoothing Bene￿ts of Unemployment Insurance,￿Amer-
ican Economic Review LXXXVII (1997), 192-205.
Hahn, Jinyong, Petra Todd and Wilbert Van der Klaauw, ￿Identi￿cation and Estimation of
Treatment E⁄ects with a Regression-Discontinuity Design,￿Econometrica LXIX(1) (January 2001),
201-209.
Hall, Robert E., ￿Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis: The-
ory and Evidence,￿Journal of Political Economy LXXXVI(6) (December 1978), 971-987.
Hall, Robert and Frederic S. Mishkin, ￿The Sensitivity of Consumption to Transitory Income:
Estimates from panel data on households,￿Econometrica L (1982), 461-481.
Hansen, Gary D., and Ayse Imrohoroglu, ￿The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy
with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard,￿Journal of Political Economy C(1) (1992), 118-142.
Hsieh, Chang-Tai, ￿Do Consumers Respond to Anticipated Income Shocks? Evidence from the
Alaska Permanent Fund,￿American Economic Review IC (March 2003), 397-405.
44Jovanovic, Boyan, ￿Job matching and the theory of turnover,￿ Journal of Political Economy
LXXXVII (1979), 972-990.
Katz, Lawrence and Bruce Meyer, ￿The Impact of the Potential Duration of Unemployment
Bene￿ts on the Duration of Unemployment,￿Journal of Public Economics XLI (1990), 45-72.
Lalive, Rafael, Jan C. Van Ours, and Josef Zweimuller, ￿How Changes in Financial Incentives
A⁄ect the Duration of Unemployment,￿Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming 2006.
Lalive, Rafael and Josef Zweimuller, ￿Bene￿t Entitlement and Unemployment Duration: The
Role of Policy Endogeneity,￿Journal of Public Economics LXXXVIII (December 2004), 2587-2616.
Lee, David ￿Randomized Experiments from Non-random Selection in U.S. House Elections,￿
Journal of Econometrics, forthcoming, 2006.
Lee, David and David Card, ￿Regression Discontinuity Inference with Speci￿cation Error,￿
National Bureau of Economic Research Technical Working Paper #322, 2006.
Lentz, Rasmus and and Torben Tranaes, ￿Job Search and Savings: Wealth E⁄ects and Duration
Dependence,￿Journal of Labor Economics XXIII (2005), 467-489.
Lise, Jeremy, ￿On the Job Search and Precautionary Savings: Theory and Empirics of Wealth
and Inequality.￿ Unpublished Manuscript, Queen￿ s University Department of Economics (2006).
McCall, Brian P., ￿Occupational Matching: A Test of Sorts,￿ Journal of Political Economy
XCVIII (February 1990), 45-69.
Meyer, Bruce, ￿Unemployment insurance and unemployment spells,￿ Econometrica LVIII(4)
(1990), 757- 782.
Michaelides, Alex, ￿A Reconciliation of Two Alternative Approaches towards Bu⁄er Stock Sav-
ing,￿Economics Letters 79 (2003), 137-143.
Mortensen, Dale T., ￿Unemployment Insurance and Job Seach Decisions,￿Industrial and Labor
Relations Review XXX(4) (July 1977), 505-517.
Mortensen, Dale T., ￿Job Search and Labor Market Analysis,￿ In Ashenfelter, Orley and
Richard Layard, eds. Handbook of Labor Economics II (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1986),
849-920.
Oi, Walter and Todd Idson, ￿Firm Size and Wages.￿ In Ashenfelter, Orley and David Card,
eds, Handbook of Labor Economics IIIB (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1999).
Parker, Jonathan, ￿The Reaction of Household Consumption to Predictable Changes in Social
Security Taxes,￿American Economic Review, LXXXIX(4) (September 1999), 959-973.
Paxson, Christina, ￿Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to Transi-
tory Income in Thailand.￿American Economic Review LXXXII(1) (1992), 15-33.
Pichelmann, Karl and Helmut Hofer, ￿Austria: Long Term Success Through Social Partner-
ship.￿ ILO Employment and Training Department Country Employment Policy Review (Geneva:
International Labor O¢ ce 1999).
Poterba, James M., ￿Are Consumers Forward Looking? Evidence from Fiscal Experiments,￿
American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), LXXVIII(2) (May 1988), 413-418.
Shapiro, Matthew D., and Joel Slemrod, ￿Consumer Response to the Timing of Income: Ev-
idence from a Change in Tax Withholding,￿American Economic Review LXXXV (March 1995),
274-283.
Shimer, Robert and Ivan Werning, ￿Liquidity and Insurance for the Unemployed,￿ Univ. of
Chicago mimeo (2005).
Shimer, Robert and Ivan Werning, ￿Reservation Wages and Unemployment Insurance,￿forth-
coming, Quarterly Journal of Economics (2006).
Souleles, Nicholas (1999), ￿The Response of Household Consumption to Income Tax Refunds,￿
American Economic Review LXXXIX(4) (September 1999), 947-958.
45Stiglbauer, Alfred, Franz Stahl, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer and Josef Zweim￿ller, ￿Job Creation
and Job Destruction in a Regulated Labor Market: The Case of Austria,￿Empirica XXX (2003),
127-148.
Thistlewaite, D. and D. Campbell, ￿Regression-Discontinuity Analysis: An Alternative to the
Ex Post Fact Experiment,￿Journal of Educational Psychology LI (1960), 309-317.
Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf, ￿Bene￿t Duration and Unemployment Entry: A Quasi-Experiment in
Austria,￿European Economic Review XLII (2003), 259-273.
Wang, Cheng and Stephen Williamson, ￿Unemployment insurance with moral hazard in a
dynamic economy,￿Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy XLIV (1996), 1-41.
Zeldes, Stephen P., ￿Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical Investigation,￿
Journal of Political Economy XCVII(2) (1989), 305-346.
46Mean Median Std. Dev.
Worker Characteristics:
Age in Years 31.20 30.00 7.96
Female 0.52 1.00 0.50
Post-compulsory Schooling 0.60 1.00 0.49
Married 0.43 0.00 0.50
Austrian Citizen 0.88 1.00 0.33
Blue Collar Occupation 0.58 1.00 0.49
Previous Job/Employment:
Months of Tenure 25.61 21.90 11.93
Months Worked in Past 5 Years 41.11 44.10 13.79
Eligible for Severance Pay 0.21 0.00 0.41
Eligible for Extended UI 0.66 1.00 0.47
Previous Wage (Euros/yr) 17,034 15,950 7,588
Wage Top-Coded 0.02 0.00 0.14
Number of Employees at Firm 299.45 31.00 1271.82
Post-Layoff:
Duration of Unemployment (months) 4.75 2.94 8.37
Unemployed < 20 Weeks 0.64 1.00 0.48
Unemployed < 52 Weeks 0.94 1.00 0.24
Duration of Nonemployment (months) 16.93 4.29 38.19
Nonemployed < 20 Weeks 0.51 1.00 0.50
Nonemployed < 52 Weeks 0.77 1.00 0.42
Observed in New Job 0.92 1.00 0.27
Among those with New Job:
  Months to Re-employment 8.96 3.84 17.71
  Change in Log Wage -0.03 -0.01 0.51
TABLE 1
Sample Characteristics: Austrian Job Losers, 1980-2001
Note: Based on sample of 650,922 job losers over the period 1980-2001.  Sample includes 
universe of Austrians losing a job in the private sector who (1) are between the age 20-50, 
(2) worked at their previous firm between 1 and 5 years and worked a total of between 1 
and 5 years out of the last 5 years, (3) took up UI benefits within 28 days of job loss 
(eliminating job quitters), (4) were not recalled to their prior firm.  Individuals losing a job in 
construction are also excluded. Wages expressed in real (year 2000) Euros.  
Unemployment duration is time registered as unemployed; nonemployment duration is 
time to next job.(1) (2) (3) (4)
Restricted Restricted Full With
sample sample sample controls
Severance pay -0.127 -0.125 -0.115
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018)
Extended benefits -0.084 -0.093 -0.064
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
Sample size 512,767 512,767 650,922 565,835
and dummies for month and year of job termination.  Standard errors shown in parentheses.
Effects of Severance Pay and EB on Durations: Hazard Model Estimates
TABLE 2
NOTE--All specifications report estimates of Cox hazard models for nonemployment durations (time 
to next job) censored at twenty weeks; hence, coefficient estimates can be interpreted as percent 
change in average job finding hazard over first twenty weeks of the spell.  Specifications 1 and 2 
are estimated on the restricted sample of individuals who worked at another firm for at least one 
month within the past five years.  Specification 1 includes an indicator for severance pay eligibility 
and a cubic polynomial for job tenure interacted with severance indicator.  Specification 2 includes 
an indicator for extended-benefit eligibility and a cubic polynomial for months worked in past 5 years 
interacted with EB indicator. Specifications 3 and 4 report estimates of model specified in equation 
(15), with cubic polynomials for both job tenure and months worked interacted with severance pay 
and EB indicators.  Specifications 3 and 4 are estimated on the full sample, defined in notes to 
Table 1.  Specification 4 includes the following additional controls: gender, marital status, Austrian 
nationality, "blue collar" occupation indicator, age and its square, log previous wage and its square, (1) (2) (3) (4)
Add Control Exclude End of Add Measure
for End of  Tenure-Year Saturated Duration by
Tenure-Year Months Control  Set Unemployment
Severance pay -0.076 -0.095 -0.094 -0.109
(0.019) (0.033) (0.019) (0.023)
Extended benefits -0.065 -0.059 -0.064 -0.053
(0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023)
Sample size 565,835 457,783 509,355 565,835
TABLE 3a
Hazard Model Estimates: Robustness Checks
NOTE--All columns report estimates of Cox hazard models as specified in equation (15), with cubic 
polynomials for job tenure and months worked interacted with severance pay and EB indicators.  
Columns 1-3 use nonemployment durations censored at twenty weeks as dependent variable; 
column 4 uses unemployment durations, censored if there is a gap between end of unemployment 
and start of new job or if spell exceeds twenty weeks.  Coefficient estimates can be interpreted as 
percent change in average job finding or unemployment exit hazard over first twenty weeks of the 
spell.  All specifications include the covariate set used in specification 4 of Table 2.  Specification 1 
includes in addition the "end of tenure year" dummy to correct for tenure seasonality.  Specification 2 
excludes observations in the last three months of each tenure year.
Specification 3 adds the following controls: total number of employees at firm from which the work 
was laid off, total years of work experience and its square, indicator for having a job before the one 
just lost, the duration of the job before the one just lost, "blue collar" status at job prior to the one lost, 
a dummy for being recalled to the job before the one just lost, indicator for having a prior spell of 
nonemployment, the last nonemployment duration before the current spell, total number of spells of 
nonemployment in career, and dummies for education, industry, and region of job loss.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Placebo Test: Severance Pay and
Small Firms ≥2 Layoffs ≥4 Layoffs ≥5 Layoffs EB Eligibility Based on Previous Job:
  (<100) Only by firm by firm by firm no controls controls no controls
Severance pay -0.087 -0.101 -0.132 -0.100 -- -- -0.199
(0.022) (0.034) (0.058) (0.066) (0.048)
Extended benefits -0.076 -0.070 -0.079 -0.114 -- -- -0.126
(0.020) (0.033) (0.059) (0.069) (0.058)
Severance pay -- -- -- -- 0.000 0.015 0.008
placebo (previous job) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048)
Extended benefits -- -- -- -- 0.028 0.029 0.024
placebo (previous job) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
Sample size 377,525 145,905 48,390 35,579 86,339 82,388 86,339
indicators as well as placebo indicators, along with cubic polynomials for the four running variables.
 
Additional Robustness Checks and Placebo Tests
TABLE 3b
NOTE--All columns report estimates of Cox hazard models for nonemployment duration (censored at twenty weeks) as specified in 
equation (15).  Specifications 1-4 and 6 include the covariates used in specification 4 of Table 2.  Specifications 1-4 include cubic 
polynomials for job tenure and months worked interacted with severance pay and EB indicators.  Specification 1 is estimated on 
subsample of individuals laid off from a firm with under 100 employees. Specification 2 is estimated on subsample of individuals laid 
off from a firm that fired two or more workers in same month.  Specification 3 restricts the sample to layoffs of four or more workers 
and specification 4 to layoffs of five or more workers.  Specifications 5-7 are estimated on the subsample of individuals with 2+ 
terminations in the sample, and who have (a) job tenure of 1-5 years in both jobs and (b) worked 1-5 years in the 5 years preceding 
both job losses.  These models include cubics in tenure at previous job and months worked prior to the previous job loss, interacted 
with "placebo" severance pay and EB indicators based on previous job (see text for details).  Specification 7 includes actual severanc(1) (2) (3) (4)
No controls Saturated controls No controls Saturated controls
Dependent var: log wage change log wage change job leaving haz. job leaving haz.
Severance pay -0.009 -0.002 -0.017 0.000
(0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.015)
Extended benefits -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014)
Sample size 553,607 445,926 601,152 476,307
TABLE 4a
Effects of Severance Pay and EB on Match Quality
NOTE--All specifications include cubic polynomials for job tenure and months worked interacted with severance 
pay and EB indicators.  All specifications are estimated on the full sample of workers who find a new job before 
the sample ends.  Columns 1 and 2 report coefficients from OLS regressions of change in log wage from last 
year of lost job to first year of next job.  Columns 3 and 4 report coefficient estimates from Cox hazard model for 
duration of next job, censored at five years.  Coefficient estimates in columns 3 and 4 can be interpreted as 
average change in job leaving hazard over first five years of next job.  Specifications 1 and 3 include no 
additional controls; specifications 2 and 4 include "saturated" control set used in specification 3 of Table 3a (see 
notes to Table 3a for details).(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log wage change Change in  Switch Move to firm in 
Dependent var: over 2 years log firm size industries different district
Severance pay 0.006 -0.034 -0.002 0.015
(0.008) (0.032) (0.007) (0.007)
Extended benefits -0.021 -0.011 0.001 0.003
(0.008) (0.030) (0.007) (0.006)
Sample size 250,788 430,120 447,931 447,767
Additional Measures of Match Quality
TABLE 4b
NOTE--All specifications report estimates of OLS regressions that include cubic polynomials for job tenure and 
months worked interacted with severance pay and EB indicators, as well as the "saturated" control set used in 
specification 3 of Table 3a (see notes to Table 3a for details).  All specifications are estimated on the full sample 
of workers who find a new job before the sample ends and for whom the dependent variable is non-missing.  
Dependent variables of the models are as follows: specification 1 -- change in log wage from last year of lost job 
to second year of next job; specification 2 -- difference in log of number of employees at new firm and previous 
firm; specification 3 -- indicator for switching industries; specification 4 -- indicator for switching to a firm in a 
different geographical district.  A. Credit-Constraint Model
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
0.176 0.243 0.254 0.237
B. PIH Model with Unrestricted Borrowing
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
Interest Rate (r):      
3% 0.004 0.008 0.012 0.016
5% 0.007 0.013 0.020 0.026
10% 0.013 0.026 0.039 0.052
15% 0.020 0.039 0.059 0.078
30% 0.040 0.079 0.117 0.155
C. Empirical Estimates
Point Estimate Std. Error
No Controls: 0.174 0.041
Saturated Controls: 0.192 0.071
TABLE 5
Calibration Results vs. Empirical Estimates of Sample Moment m2
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion (γ):  
NOTE--Panels A and B report predicted values of ratio m2 from Credit Constraint and PIH models 
with parameter values as shown. Rate of time discount is set equal to the interest rate in PIH 
calibrations. See text for formulas used to calculate these numbers.  Panel C shows empirical 
estimates of m2 using hazard model estimates from Column 3 of Table 2 (no controls) and Column 3 
of Table 3a (saturated controls).  Standard errors are calculated using delta method.  Values shown 
in bold correspond to those discussed in text and shown in Figure 1.
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion (γ):  FI     PIH Data    CC       CM
FI. Full insurance: PIH with complete markets
PIH. Standard PIH with unrestricted borrowing and lending
Data. Empirical estimate of m2 using Austrian data
CC.  Credit constrained: binding asset limit but forward looking
CM. Complete myopia “rule of thumb” with consumption = income
sensitivity to cash-on-hand
m2 =  0      0.01 0.17           0.24
)
Figure 1
Dynamic Models Ordered by Sensitivity to Cash-on-Hand

x








, a normalized measure of sensitivity to cash-on-hand (see section
III for details). The values of m2 shown for the PIH and CC models are calculated in section
VIII, and assume a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2. See Table 5 for calibrated values
of m2 for the PIH and CC models under alternative assumptions. The empirical value of m2
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Eligibility for Severance Pay by Past Employment
Figure 2b
NOTE–These figures illustrate the “double discontinuity” problem. In Figure 2a, individuals
in the sample are grouped into “tenure-month” categories based on the number of whole
months they worked at the firm from which they were laid off. Figure 2a plots the fraction of
individuals in each tenure-month category who are eligible for EB. The fraction eligible for
severance pay jumps from 0 to 1 at 36 months of job tenure. In Figure 2b, individuals in the
sample are grouped into “months-employed” categories based on the number of whole
months they worked at any firm within the past five years. Figure 2b plots the fraction of
individuals in each months-worked category who are eligible for severance pay. The fraction
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Frequency of Layoffs by Job Tenure
Figure 3
NOTE–In this figure, individuals in the sample are grouped into “tenure-month” categories
based on the number of whole months they worked at the firm from which they were laid off.
The figure plots the frequency of layoffs by tenure-month category, i.e. the total number of
individuals in the sample within each tenure-month category. The vertical line denotes the
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Selection on Observables
Figure 4c
NOTE–Figures 4a-c show how observable characteristics vary around the cutoff for
severance pay eligibility. Figure 4a plots the average age of workers at the date of layoff in
each tenure-month category. Figure 4b plots the average annual wage in the final year of
the job from which the individual was laid off. Figure 4c plots predicted hazard ratios from a
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Effect of Severance Pay: Restricted Sample
Figure 5b
NOTE–These figures plot average nonemployment durations (time to next job) in each
tenure-month category. They exclude observations with nonemployment durations of more
than two years and ignore censoring. The vertical line denotes the cutoff for severance pay
eligibility. Figure 5a uses the full sample. Figure 5b uses the “restricted sample” of
individuals who have been employed at another firm (besides the one from which they were
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Effect of Severance Pay Adjusted for Tenure Seasonality
Figure 6c
NOTE–Figures 6a-c plot the J coefficients from the Cox proportional hazards regression
specified in equation (14). The values can be interpreted as the percentage difference in the
average job finding hazard during the first twenty weeks after job loss between each
tenure-month group and tenure-month group 35. For example, Figure 6a shows that the
average hazard among individuals laid off with 36 months of job tenure is 10% below that of
individuals laid off with 35 months of job tenure. Figure 6a plots the coefficients from a
regression that controls only for the EB effect. Figure 6b controls for the set of additional
covariates used in column 4 of Table 2. Figure 6c corrects for the “tenure seasonality”
pattern visible in the first two figures as described in the text. All three figures are drawn
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Job Tenure in Job Before the One Just Lost (Months)
Placebo Test: Lagged Job Tenure and Nonemployment Durations
Figure 7
NOTE–The sample for this figure includes all individuals who have two or more
unemployment spells in the data. Individuals are grouped into categories based on the
number of whole months they worked at the firm prior to the one from which they were most
recently laid off. The figures plots mean nonemployment durations (time to next job) in the
current spell by tenure at the prior firm. The figure excludes observations with
nonemployment durations of more than two years and ignores censoring. The vertical line
denotes completion of three years of service at the prior firm; the fraction receiving
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20 Weeks of UI 30 Weeks of UI
Effect of Extended Benefits on Job Finding Hazards by Week
Figure 8b
NOTE–These figures plot average weekly job finding hazards during the first thirty weeks
after job loss in the restricted sample. In Figure 8a, individuals in the “no severance” group
are those laid off with between 33 and 35 whole months of job tenure; individuals in the
“severance” group have between 36 and 38 whole months of job tenure . In Figure 8b,
individuals in the “20 weeks of UI” group have worked for between 33 and 35 whole months
in the past five years; individuals in the “30 weeks of UI” group have between 36 and 38
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Effect of Extended Benefits on Job Finding Hazards
Figure 9c
NOTE–In Figures 9a-c, individuals are grouped into “months-employed” categories based on
the number of whole months they worked at any firm within the past five years. Figures 9a
and 9b plot mean nonemployment durations in each months-employed category in the full
and restricted samples, respectively. These two figures exclude observations with
nonemployment durations of more than two years and ignore censoring. Figure 9c plots
coefficients from a Cox proportional hazards regression analogous to that used in Figure 6a,
controlling for the severance pay effect using a cubic polynomial, in the full sample. The
values plotted can be interpreted as the percentage difference in the average job finding
hazard during the first twenty weeks of the spell between each months-worked group and
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Effect of Severance Pay on Subsequent Job Duration
Figure 10b
NOTE–Figure 10a plots average wage growth (difference in log annual wage between next
job and the job from which the individual was laid off) in each tenure-month group. Figure
10b plots coefficients from a Cox proportional hazards model for the duration of the next job
with dummies for each job tenure category. The values can be interpreted as the
percentage difference in the average job leaving hazard during the first five years of the next
job between each job tenure group and the group with job tenure equal to 35. The sample
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Effect of Extended Benefits on Subsequent Job Duration
Figure 11b
NOTE–These figures replicate Figure 10 using months worked as the running variable on
the x-axis. Figure 11a plots average wage growth in each months-worked group. Figure
11b plots coefficients from a Cox proportional hazards model for the duration of the next job
with dummies for each job tenure category. The values plotted can be interpreted as the
percentage difference in the average job leaving hazard during the first five years of the next
job between each months-worked group and the group with months-worked equal to 35.
The sample for both figures includes all individuals in the full sample observed in a new job.